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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
  
 One of the many provisions of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), requires employer-provided health insurance plans to 
cover an array of preventative services, including FDA-
approved contraceptives, at no cost to participating 
employees.  Employees have the option of seeking out 
covered medical providers and using their services, in which 
case they are reimbursed, or they can choose not to use them.  
The particular provision that includes contraceptive coverage 
is commonly referred to as the “Contraceptive Mandate,” and 
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it includes a limited exemption for houses of worship and 
their integrated auxiliaries.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a); 77 
Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,726 (Feb. 15, 2012).  A wider set of 
religious non-profit and for-profit employers may receive an 
accommodation whereby they opt out of providing 
contraceptive coverage, with the Government then arranging 
for their employees to receive the coverage through third 
parties at no cost to, and with no participation of, the 
objecting employers.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)–(c); 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874–39,875 (July 2, 2013); Zubik v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016).  
 
 Two years after we upheld this opt-out accommodation 
in Geneva College v. Secretary United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 778 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 
2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 
1561, we now confront the house-of-worship exemption.   
This appeal presents two primary questions that again derive 
from the purported intersection of the Contraceptive Mandate 
and religion:  (1) whether the Contraceptive Mandate must 
exempt a secular anti-abortion group with no religious 
affiliation, and (2) whether an employee’s religious beliefs 
are substantially burdened by the law’s requirement that his 
or her employer’s insurance plan cover contraceptives.  After 
careful review, but without any hesitation, we answer both 
questions in the negative.  
 
 Appellant Real Alternatives urges that, pursuant to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, if a 
religious organization may be exempted from the 
Contraceptive Mandate, then non-religious entities with an 
identical stance on contraceptives must be exempted as well.  
Real Alternatives additionally challenges the Contraceptive 
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Mandate and the criteria for the exemption as not only 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures 
Act but also contrary to federal law.   
 
 The other appellants, three employees of Real 
Alternatives, bring individual challenges to the Contraceptive 
Mandate.  They argue that the Contraceptive Mandate 
violates the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a–7(d).  
They also argue that maintaining a health insurance plan that 
covers contraceptives through their employer violates their 
religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (“RFRA”).   
 
 The District Court denied Appellants’ motion for 
summary judgment in its entirety and granted the 
Government’s cross-motion for summary judgment in its 
entirety.  Because we agree with the District Court’s rulings 
on all of the issues raised, we will affirm. 
  
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
1.  The Affordable Care Act and the Contraceptive 
Mandate 
 
 In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) 
(collectively, the “ACA”).  The ACA requires non-
grandfathered group health plans and insurance providers to 
cover four categories of preventative health services, without 
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cost-sharing, as provided for in guidelines supported by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), an 
arm of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”).1  One of these four categories is “preventative care 
and screenings” for women.   
 
 HHS requested assistance from the Institute of 
Medicine (“IOM”), a non-profit division of the National 
Academy of Sciences, to develop guidelines on the specific 
preventative services for women to be covered under the 
ACA (none existed at the time the ACA was passed).  The 
IOM recommended that HRSA endorse a list of services that 
included “[FDA]-approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling 
for all women with reproductive capacity.”  Institute of 
Medicine, Clinical Preventative Services for Women:  
Closing the Gaps 10 (2011).  Examples of FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods are diaphragms, oral contraceptives, 
intrauterine devices, and emergency contraceptives.  Id. at 
105–06.  HRSA adopted the IOM’s guidelines in full.  Health 
Resources & Service Administration, Women’s Preventative 
Service Guidelines, available at 
https://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2017).  In doing so, HRSA required every group health plan 
and health insurance plan to include coverage for these 
preventative care services to employees working at non-
                                              
1 Grandfathered health plan coverage is that which has 
existed continually prior to March 23, 2010 and has not 
undergone any of several specified changes since that time.  
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251 (2010).  
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exempt employers (the “Contraceptive Mandate”).  It did not 
require anything from the employee.  
 
2.  Exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate 
 At the same time as HRSA adopted IOM’s 
recommended guidelines, an exemption from the 
Contraceptive Mandate for certain religious employers was 
proposed as an interim final regulation (the “Exemption”).  76 
Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011).  Commenters to the 
proposed guidelines had suggested that requiring religious 
employers to sponsor group health plans that provide 
contraceptive services could impinge on those employers’ 
religious freedom.  Id. at 46,623.  In light of those comments, 
HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury 
(collectively, the “Departments”), the agencies named in Real 
Alternatives’s underlying lawsuit, authorized HRSA to 
exempt certain religious employers from the Contraceptive 
Mandate.  The Departments specified that they sought “to 
provide for a religious accommodation that respects the 
unique relationship between a house of worship and its 
employees in ministerial positions” and that “[s]uch an 
accommodation would be consistent with the policies of 
States that require contraceptive services coverage, the 
majority of which simultaneously provide for a religious 
accommodation.”2  Id. 
                                              
2 Though the language here refers to religious 
accommodation, these statements refer to what would 
ultimately become the exemption given to religious employers 
under the ACA.  The Departments established a separate 
accommodation for certain employers, addressed supra, that 
is not at issue in this litigation.  
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 The Departments originally defined a religious 
employer as an employer that:   
 
(1) has as its purpose the inculcation of 
religious values;  
(2) primarily employs persons who share its 
religious tenets; 
(3) primarily serves persons who share its 
religious tenets; and 
(4) is a non-profit organization under Section 
6033(a)(1) and Section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) 
of the [Internal Revenue] Code.3  
 
Id.  The Departments also noted that HRSA’s “discretion to 
establish an exemption applies only to group health plans 
sponsored by certain religious employers and group health 
insurance offered in connection with such plans,” and thus 
“health insurance issuers in the individual health insurance 
market would not be covered under any such exemption.”  Id. 
at 46,623–24 (emphasis added).  The Departments formally 
adopted the four-part definition for exempted employers in 
2012.  They also created a one-year safe harbor for non-
exempted, non-profit organizations with religious objections, 
and announced that they would develop and propose changes 
to the regulation that “would meet two goals—providing 
                                              
3 Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code refers in 
relevant part to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions or associations of churches,” and “the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order.”  26 
U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i). 
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contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing to individuals 
who want it and accommodating non-exempted, non-profit 
organizations’ religious objections to covering contraceptive 
services . . . .”  77 Fed. Reg. at 8,727.   
 
 The final rules regarding the Exemption went into 
effect in 2012.  The Departments replaced the multifactor 
religious employer test with one definition, essentially the 
fourth prong of the previous test:  “[A]n employer that is 
organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to 
in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] 
Code,” which addresses churches and their integrated 
auxiliaries.  78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874.  The Departments noted 
that this new definition “continues to respect the religious 
interests of houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries 
in a way that does not undermine the governmental interests 
furthered by the contraceptive coverage requirement.”  Id.  
The Departments also stated: 
 
Houses of worship and their integrated 
auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage 
on religious grounds are more likely than other 
employers to employ people of the same faith 
who share the same objection, and who would 
therefore be less likely than other people to use 
contraceptive services even if such services 
were covered under their plan.   
 
Id.  The Departments added that their statement about a 
religious employer’s likelihood to hire employees who share 
religious beliefs opposing contraceptives was made in 
response to commenters concerned that the Exemption would 
“undermine the [G]overnment’s compelling interests in 
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promoting public health and ensuring that women have equal 
access to health care . . . .”  80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,325 (July 
14, 2015); see also 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,887 (“Nor do the 
exemption for religious employers and the accommodations 
for eligible organizations undermine the [G]overnment’s 
compelling interests.”). 
 
 In 2015, the Departments stated that the Exemption 
was “provided against the backdrop of the longstanding 
governmental recognition of a particular sphere of autonomy 
for houses of worship, such as the special treatment given to 
those organizations in the [Internal Revenue] Code.”  80 Fed. 
Reg. at 41,325.  They continued:  
  
This exemption . . . is consistent with their 
special status under longstanding tradition in 
our society and under federal law, and is not a 
mere product of the likelihood that these 
institutions hire coreligionists.  Hiring 
coreligionists is not itself a determinative factor 
as to whether an organization should be 
accommodated or exempted from the 
contraceptive requirements. 
  
Id.   
B.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
1.  Appellant Real Alternatives  
 Appellant Real Alternatives is a non-profit, non-
religious, anti-abortion organization.  It does not hold itself 
out as a religious entity, is not incorporated as such, and has 
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not adopted any religious views or positions.  Its primary 
purpose is to provide “life-affirming alternatives to abortion 
services,” and it offers pregnancy and parenting support 
programs as well as abstinence education services to women 
and families throughout Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Indiana.  
J.A. 92–93.   
 
 Real Alternatives avers that its views on human life are 
based on science, reason, and non-religious philosophical 
principles.  Id. at 93.  In addition to opposing abortion, Real 
Alternatives opposes the use of all contraceptives because it 
considers these drugs to be “morally wrong.”  Id. at 94. 
 
 Real Alternatives administers its programs through 
networks of social service agencies, which Real Alternatives 
hires as subcontractors.  It requires all of its subcontracting 
organizations to share its views and to agree not to provide or 
recommend contraceptives or abortion.  It only hires 
employees who share the company’s stance on contraceptives 
and abortion.  
 
 Since 2008, Real Alternatives has excluded 
contraceptive care from the health insurance plan it offers to 
its employees.  Real Alternatives alleges that in 2014, because 
of the ACA, its insurer stopped omitting contraceptive care 
from coverage and, as a result, a new plan was offered to 
employees.4  According to Real Alternatives, were it not for 
the ACA, its insurance provider would be willing to revert to 
providing a plan that omits contraceptive coverage.  Real 
                                              
4 Because the original insurance plan was terminated, it 
does not qualify for grandfathered status.   
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Alternatives avers that the Contraceptive Mandate violates the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”).   
 
2.  Appellants Real Alternatives Employees 
 Appellants Kevin I. Bagatta, Thomas A. Lang, and 
Clifford W. McKeown work for Real Alternatives (the “Real 
Alternatives Employees”).  They are, respectively, the 
President, Vice President of Operations, and Vice President 
of Administration of Real Alternatives.  They are the only 
full-time employees of Real Alternatives, and they aver that 
they share the company’s beliefs concerning contraceptive 
drugs.  Each employee receives health insurance coverage 
through Real Alternatives, as do their wives and total of seven 
minor children, three of whom are female.   
 The Real Alternatives Employees aver that the 
Contraceptive Mandate violates the Church Amendment.  
They also aver that the Contraceptive Mandate violates their 
religious rights under RFRA.  Specifically, they allege that 
their “sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit them from 
using, supporting, or otherwise advocating the use of 
abortifacients, or participating in a health insurance plan that 
covers such items for themselves or their families.”  J.A. 123. 
 
3.  District Court Opinion 
 The District Court denied Real Alternatives’s motion 
for summary judgment in its entirety and granted the 
Government’s cross-motion for summary judgment in its 
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entirety.5  We find the District Court’s analysis informative 
and persuasive for the most part, and we review it here.    
 
 The District Court began by addressing Real 
Alternatives’s equal protection claim, finding in the first 
instance that Real Alternatives is not similarly situated to 
religious employers with comparable objections to the 
Contraceptive Mandate because, notwithstanding those 
objections, they do not share the same bases for those 
positions—namely, religion versus a single secular position.  
As discussed infra, the District Court raised and distinguished 
two relevant federal cases, Center for Inquiry, Inc., v. Marion 
Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014), and March 
for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2015).  The 
District Court also focused on the “vast history of legislative 
protections [that] exist[] to safeguard religious freedom,” and 
contrasted “[m]oral philosophies,” which it found “have been 
historically unable to enjoy the same privileged state.”  J.A. 
35.  The District Court continued that even if Real 
Alternatives were similarly situated to a house of worship, 
respecting religious autonomy plainly constitutes a legitimate 
purpose to allow the classification to stand under rational 
basis review.  The District Court examined the Government’s 
statements in the ACA regulations and found that it had 
sufficiently identified religious freedom as the purpose 
furthered by the Exemption.  The District Court concluded its 
equal protection analysis by expressing concern that 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1361, 2201, & 2202; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; and 5 
U.S.C. § 702.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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“[a]llowing adherence to a single moral belief . . . to be 
indistinguishable from religion or an entire moral creed . . . 
leads us down a slippery slope.”  Id. at 42–43.  It reasoned 
that “finding a singular moral objection to law on par with a 
religious objection” could very well lead to a flood of similar 
objections.  Id. at 44. 
 
 Next, the District Court concluded that Real 
Alternatives’s claim that the Contraceptive Mandate is 
arbitrary and capricious “fail[s] for the same reasons that [its] 
Fifth Amendment equal protection claim lacked merit.”  Id. at 
49; see also id. at 48 (noting that “[t]he standard for 
determining whether an [APA] violation exists under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard is markedly similar to 
rational basis review”).  The District Court also rejected Real 
Alternatives’s argument that the Contraceptive Mandate 
violates federal law—namely, the ACA and the Weldon 
Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster 
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009 (the 
“Weldon Amendment”)—as well as the Real Alternatives 
Employees’ claim that it violates the Church Amendment.   
 
 Finally, the District Court rejected the Real 
Alternatives Employees’ RFRA claim.  It found that the 
burden at issue—maintaining an insurance plan that includes 
coverage for preventative services—was not substantial 
enough based on the Supreme Court’s approach in other 
RFRA cases.  See J.A. 62 (first citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 703 (1986) (holding that the Government could 
condition public benefits on the religiously prohibited act of 
providing a social security number without trampling on the 
beneficiary’s free exercise rights); then citing Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) 
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(finding that building a road through sacred land did not 
violate the free exercise rights of those who believed in the 
land’s religious significance)).  The District Court concluded 
in the alternative that, even if the Contraceptive Mandate did 
impose a substantial burden, it would still satisfy RFRA 
because it was the least restrictive means of furthering the 
Government’s compelling interest in a broadly applicable 
system of health care that advances public health and gender 
equality.    
 
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that 
the district court should have applied.6  Abramson v. William 
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).  A 
court grants summary judgment if “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  There 
are no material facts in dispute; the questions raised by the 
parties are matters of law, which we review de novo.  Shuman 
ex. rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
                                              
6 When the parties were before the District Court, Real 
Alternatives moved for summary judgment and the 
Departments moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment.  The District Court treated the 
Departments’ motion as one for summary judgment, and we 
will review accordingly.   
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B.  Equal Protection Claim7 
 Real Alternatives challenges the constitutionality of 
the Exemption’s scope, arguing that it violates the 
organization’s right to equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment by exempting only religious employers and not 
other secular entities, such as itself, that oppose the 
requirements set forth in the Contraceptive Mandate.  Real 
Alternatives urges that “[t]here is no rational purpose to 
impose the Mandate on those who do not want the items and 
will not use them,” and contends that it is excluded from the 
Exemption “simply because [it] is a ‘non-religious ethical 
group[]’ instead of a church.”  Appellants’ Br. at 28 (final 
alteration in original).  If churches receive a religious 
exemption, the argument goes, then so too must non-religious 
entities.   
 
1.  Legal Standard 
 To prevail on its equal protection claim, Real 
Alternatives must show that the Government has treated it 
differently from a similarly situated party and that the 
Government’s explanation for the differing treatment does not 
satisfy the relevant level of scrutiny.  City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985).  The 
                                              
7 The equal protection and APA claims are brought both 
by Real Alternatives the entity and by Bagatta, Lang, and 
McKeown, the organization’s three full-time employees.  For 
the sake of concision, we will refer to this group of appellants 
as “Real Alternatives.”   
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parties agree, as they must, that rational basis review is the 
applicable standard.  Thus, there must be “a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some 
legitimate governmental purpose.”  United States v. Pollard, 
326 F.3d 397, 407 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).  Rational basis review confers a 
“presumption of validity” on legislation, and “the plaintiff 
must negate every conceivable justification for the 
classification in order to prove that the classification is wholly 
irrational.”  Brian B. ex rel. Lois B. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 230 
F.3d 582, 586 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing FCC v. Beach 
Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993)). 
 
2.  Analysis 
 We must first determine whether Real Alternatives is 
similarly situated to a religious employer, such that the 
Exemption must be available to the group absent a legitimate 
rationale.  There is no question it is not.  
 
 Real Alternatives leans on its company-mandated 
eschewal of contraceptives in an attempt to situate itself in 
lockstep with religious employers who can avail themselves 
of the Exemption, contending that it is in fact “more 
favorably” or “identically” situated to houses of worship 
because all of its employees by definition oppose 
contraceptive coverage.  Appellants’ Br. at 28, 30.  In making 
this claim, Real Alternatives invokes Center for Inquiry, in 
which the Seventh Circuit struck down an Indiana statute that 
permitted religious officials to solemnize marriages but 
prohibited their counterparts from secular groups from doing 
the same.  758 F.3d at 875.  There, the court reasoned that 
“[a]n accommodation cannot treat religions favorably when 
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secular groups are identical with respect to the attribute 
selected for that accommodation.”  Id. at 872. 
 
 But Real Alternatives ignores key distinctions between 
that case and this one.  Most notably, Real Alternatives 
disregards the stark contrast between itself and the appellant 
in Center for Inquiry, a humanist group that resembles a 
“religion[] in everything except belief in a deity.”  Id. at 871.  
Real Alternatives is a completely different type of entity, 
particularly because of its structure, aim, purpose, and 
function in its members’ lives.  Indeed, Real Alternatives’s 
credo is limited to a one-sentence mission statement that says 
it “exists to provide life-affirming alternatives to abortion 
services throughout the nation.”   J.A. 92.  In Center for 
Inquiry, the humanist organization explicitly argued that “its 
methods and values play the same role in its members’ lives 
as religious methods and values play in the lives of 
adherents.”  758 F.3d at 871 (emphasis added).  Real 
Alternatives makes no such claim, as it is solely concerned 
with administering programs that reflect its moral opposition 
to contraceptives and abortion.  Thus, Center for Inquiry does 
not help Real Alternatives demonstrate that it is similarly 
situated to a religious entity.   
 
 However, Real Alternatives does bear some 
resemblance to the plaintiffs in March for Life, the district 
court decision upon which it heavily relies.  There, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary 
judgment to a non-profit, secular anti-abortion group on its 
equal protection challenge to the Contraceptive Mandate.  We 
cannot accept the district court’s reasoning in that case.  
Relying almost exclusively on Center for Inquiry, the district 
court found that the secular group at issue was “similarly 
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situated with regard to the precise attribute selected for 
accommodation”—specifically, a shared view that abortion is 
wrong.  March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 126 (emphasis 
omitted).  But that court—and, by extension, Real 
Alternatives—ignored a crucial point:  Unlike the corporation 
in Center for Inquiry, which involved a comprehensive belief 
system that happened not to be deity-centric, a secular anti-
abortion group mirrors a single-issue interest group and not a 
religious organization that takes advantage of the Exemption.  
We agree with Judge Jones’s observation regarding the 
disparities between the two groups:  “In every other respect, 
they are different.  Real Alternatives is an employer, a 
company, and not a belief system . . . and its single mission 
statement cannot guide believers comprehensively throughout 
life as a religion can.”  J.A. 42; cf. United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (accommodating a secular pacifist’s 
objections to the draft because his beliefs “occup[y] the same 
place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the 
lives of” adherents to religion).  
 
 Real Alternatives is in no way like a religious 
denomination or one of its nontheistic counterparts—not in 
structure, not in aim, not in purpose, and not in function.  We 
do not doubt that Real Alternatives’s stance on contraceptives 
is grounded in sincerely-held moral values, but “religion is 
not generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; 
it has a broader scope.”  Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 
(3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).  We have accordingly 
noted three “guideposts” courts ought to use when identifying 
a religion: 
 
First, a religion addresses fundamental and 
ultimate questions having to do with deep and 
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imponderable matters.  Second, a religion is 
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-
system as opposed to an isolated teaching.  
Third, a religion often can be recognized by the 
presence of certain formal and external signs.   
 
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).  
We thus agree with Amici Curiae that “Real Alternatives is 
functionally similar not to a church, but to the countless 
nonreligious 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations that take 
morally informed positions on some discrete set of issues,” 
such as the NAACP and the National Organization for 
Marriage.8  Amici Curiae Br. at 16.  
                                              
8 We further agree with Amici Curiae that while 
commitment to an anti-abortion platform may be important to 
the people who hold them, that commitment is “not a religion 
in any legally or theologically accepted sense; and 
organizations do not become quasi-churches for equal-
protection purposes merely by espousing a commitment of 
that sort.”  Amici Curiae Br. at 15; see also Malnak, 592 F.2d 
at 208–10 (Adams, J., concurring) (defining nontheistic belief 
system as “religion” if it (1) deals with questions of “ultimate 
concern”; (2) provides answers that speak to comprehensive 
and ultimate truth; and (3) has formal characteristics 
analogous to those of traditional religions); Wash. Ethical 
Soc’y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C. Cir. 
1957) (finding nontheistic ethical society that had regular 
Sunday meetings, “leaders” who preached to members and 
provided spiritual guidance, and ceremonies for naming, 
marrying, and burying members qualified for tax exemption 
as church); Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 
200 F. Supp. 3d 553, 562 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (distinguishing 
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 Real Alternatives overemphasizes its shared opposition 
to contraceptive coverage while inexplicably dismissing the 
Government’s repeated statements that the Exemption “was 
provided against the backdrop of the longstanding 
governmental recognition of a particular sphere of autonomy 
for houses of worship . . . .”  80 Fed. Reg. at 41,325.  But 
framing the Exemption—or any religious exemption for that 
matter—so broadly as to encompass any employer who 
disagrees with any aspect of an underlying law lies in direct 
contradiction to the Supreme Court’s refusal to broaden 
religion-based exemptions in similar contexts.  See United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1982) (in a Social 
Security-related matter, rejecting a claim to extend a limited 
exemption because “[c]onfining the . . . exemption . . . 
provided for a narrow category which was readily 
identifiable,” and noting that “every person cannot be 
shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every 
aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs”).  Permitting 
Real Alternatives to qualify for the Exemption would 
similarly run afoul of this country’s vast history of legislative 
protections that single out and safeguard religious freedom 
                                                                                                     
between plaintiff’s beliefs, which “consist[ed] solely of his 
‘conscience’ and personal moral code,” and the “structural 
characteristics” of secular moral systems that are equivalent 
to religion except for non-belief in God); Fellowship of 
Humanity v. Cty. of Almaeda, 315 P.2d 394, 409–10 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (finding that nontheistic fellowship 
qualified for tax exemption as church because “it is conceded 
that in all respects the Fellowship’s activities are similar to 
those of the theistic groups, except for their belief or lack of 
belief in a Supreme Being”). 
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but not moral philosophy.  See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (“Where, as here, [G]overnment 
acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that 
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require 
that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular 
entities.”);9 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (“RLUIPA”) (requiring religious 
accommodation for zoning and land use regulations); 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (exempting “church plan[s]” from 
retirement-plan regulations); Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. §§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (carving out “churches, their 
integrated auxiliaries, . . . conventions or associations of 
churches,” and “the exclusively religious activities of any 
religious order” from a tax-filing requirement); Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) 
(requiring that employers not discriminate on the basis of 
religion).  If mere disagreement, however vehemently felt, 
were sufficient to bring an equal protection claim, virtually 
any law implicating religion would be rendered moot because 
the exemption would be too easy to invoke.10  Cf. Cutter v. 
                                              
9 We do not find persuasive Real Alternatives’s belabored 
efforts to distinguish Amos, and we agree with the District 
Court that the Supreme Court’s holding in that case is 
applicable here.   
10 We share the concerns of Amici Curiae that if such 
disagreement were enough to substantiate an equal protection 
claim, there would also be strong disincentives from granting 
any religious exemption because of how easy it would be to 
utilize or to extend it, thereby seriously undermining 
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Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (acknowledging that “all 
manner of religious accommodations would fall” if the Court 
struck down one law that implicated religion because of the 
similarities among religious accommodation laws). 
 
 Finally, even if Real Alternatives were deemed 
similarly situated to a religion, the group’s challenge would 
still fail because of the historic principle of respect for the 
autonomy of genuine religions.  This principle provides the 
legitimate purpose for the preferential treatment of religious 
organizations.  The Exemption “provide[s] for a religious 
accommodation that respects the unique relationship between 
a house of worship and its employees in ministerial 
positions.”  76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623.  It “was provided against 
the backdrop of the longstanding governmental recognition of 
a particular sphere of autonomy for houses of worship,” is 
“consistent with their special status under longstanding 
tradition in our society and under federal law, and is not a 
mere product of the likelihood that these institutions hire 
coreligionists.”  80 Fed. Reg. at 41,325.  Real Alternatives 
brazenly dismisses these statements as disingenuous.11  In 
                                                                                                     
countless legislative and regulatory programs.  Relatedly, 
there would be immense pressure to repeal the thousands of 
religious accommodations that have been enacted at the 
federal, state, and local levels for fear that they would become 
vehicles to avoid compliance by anyone who dislikes the 
underlying laws.   
11 Without any supporting evidence, Real Alternatives 
repeatedly contends that the Government is asking the Court 
“to ignore the actual explanation in its regulations,” i.e., the 
likelihood of religious employees using contraceptives, “and 
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doing so, it misses a crucial point about rational basis review:  
It is “constitutionally irrelevant whether this [legitimate] 
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision” because 
this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate 
its reasons for enacting a statute.  U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); see also Beach Commc’ns, 508 
U.S. at 318 (applying Fritz to an administrative action).  In 
any event, the attribute Congress selected for classification is 
not opposition to contraceptives; it is status as a house of 
worship and based on the long-established governmental 
desire to respect the autonomy of houses of worship 
regardless of their particular stance on contraceptives.   
 
 It is beyond dispute that respecting church autonomy is 
a legitimate purpose—one that not only satisfies rational basis 
review but also is enshrined in the constitutional fabric of this 
country.  Principles of noninterference trace back to “the text 
                                                                                                     
instead to suppose that the exemption was offered solely 
because of the ‘church character’ of some religious 
employers.”  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 7.  This theory hinges 
on the Government’s acknowledgment that “employees of 
employers availing themselves of the exemption would be 
less likely to use contraceptives even if contraceptives were 
covered under their health plans.”  77 Fed. Reg. at 8,728.  
While we agree that likelihood of use would not alone satisfy 
rational basis review, that statement was part of the 
Government’s explanation that the Exemption “does not 
undermine the overall benefits” of the Contraceptive 
Mandate.  Id.  It does not negate or in any way undermine the 
actual and legitimate purpose of the historic respect for 
religion put forth by the Government.  
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of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude 
to the rights of religious organizations,” and recognizes their 
“independence from secular control or manipulation—in 
short, [their] power to decide for themselves, free from state 
interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine.”  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704, 706 (2012) 
(quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian 
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Even when 
noninterference is not strictly required, the Government has 
discretion to grant certain religious accommodations subject 
to constitutional limitations.12  See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720–
22.  These accommodations may be extended to houses of 
worship and religious denominations without applying to all 
nonprofit entities in order to “alleviate significant 
governmental interference with the ability of religious 
                                              
12 The First Amendment prohibits the Government from 
inserting itself in theological disputes, appointments of 
ministers, or questions of distribution of church property; the 
Government may not dictate to houses of worship what to 
believe or how to structure their relations with clergy to 
implement and teach those beliefs.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 
132 S. Ct. at 706 (employment decisions for ministers); 
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976) (internal 
theological disputes and religious tribunals); Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (church 
property); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (appointment of clergy).     
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organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions.”13  Amos, 483 U.S. at 335; see also Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (upholding a property tax 
exemption for houses of worship); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 
at 706 (finding a “special rule for ministers grounded in the 
Religion Clauses themselves”).   
 
 We reiterate, however, that Real Alternatives cannot 
satisfy the first prong of a successful equal protection claim.  
Finding all single-issue non-profit organizations to be 
similarly situated to houses of worship based on their 
adherence to a shared position on one issue would expand 
religious exemptions beyond what is constitutionally 
required.  That a legitimate purpose of the highest order—
respect for religious autonomy—justifies the Exemption only 
underscores the inevitability of our conclusion.  We therefore 
find that Real Alternatives’s equal protection claim fails as a 
matter of law.   
 
C.  APA Claim 
 Real Alternatives asserts two claims under the APA:  
(1) the Contraceptive Mandate is arbitrary and capricious 
because it does not serve a rational governmental purpose as 
                                              
13 In this way, Center for Inquiry may be distinguished as 
an outlier example of organized secular belief systems 
gaining protected treatment.  The District Court correctly 
noted that “the majority of precedent continues to support 
preferential treatment for religion under the law, without 
explicitly extending that treatment to include secular beliefs.”  
J.A. 36. 
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applied to Real Alternatives, an organization that employs 
only people who oppose contraceptive coverage; and (2) it 
violates the Constitution and federal law.  Both claims lack 
merit.  
 
1.  Legal Standard 
 A reviewing court may “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action” that is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “(B) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(B). 
 
 We have held that the standard for determining 
whether an APA violation exists under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard is substantially similar to rational basis 
review: 
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency offers insufficient reasons for treating 
similar situations differently.  If [an] agency 
makes an exception in one case, then it must 
either make an exception in a similar case or 
point to a relevant distinction between the two 
cases.  Review of an equal protection claim in 
the context of agency action is similar to that 
under the APA.  That is, an agency’s decision 
must be upheld if under the Equal Protection 
Clause, it can show a rational basis for its 
decision.  As such, the equal protection 
argument can be folded into the APA argument, 
since no suspect class is involved and the only 
question is whether the . . . treatment of 
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[appellees] was rational (i.e., not arbitrary and 
capricious). 
 
Nazareth Hosp. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 747 F.3d 172, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2014) (alteration in 
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added).   
 
2.  Analysis 
 Because we find that Real Alternatives’s equal 
protection claim fails, we need not reexamine its arbitrary and 
capricious claim, which is subject to the same standard of 
review.  Id.   
 
 Real Alternatives argues that the Contraceptive 
Mandate also violates the APA because it infringes on two 
other federal laws:  the ACA and the Weldon Amendment.  
The Real Alternatives Employees argue that the 
Contraceptive Mandate also violates the Church Amendment 
and, therefore, the APA.  We disagree with these contentions 
and find no violations.  We address each law in turn. 
 
a.  ACA 
The ACA states that none of its provisions “shall be 
construed to require a qualified health plan to provide 
coverage of [abortion] services as part of its essential health 
benefits for any plan year.”  42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)(A)(i).  
Real Alternatives argues that the Contraceptive Mandate 
violates this provision by “requiring coverage of certain 
‘FDA-approved contraceptives’ which act as abortifacients, in 
that they cause the demise of human embryos after 
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conception and before and/or after implantation in the 
uterus.”  Appellants’ Br. at 57.  Real Alternatives does not 
cite any statutory or regulatory definition of abortion that 
includes contraceptives.14 
 
 However, longstanding FDA regulations treat 
pregnancy as “the period of time from implantation until 
delivery,” 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f), and categorize drugs that 
may prevent implantation as contraceptives rather than as 
abortifacients.  62 Fed. Reg. 8,610, 8,611 (Feb. 25, 1997) 
(“Emergency contraceptive pills are not effective if the 
woman is pregnant; they act by delaying or inhibiting 
ovulation, and/or altering tubal transport of sperm and/or ova 
(thereby inhibiting fertilization), and/or altering the 
endometrium (thereby inhibiting implantation).”).  Further, 
we defer to the Government’s definition because “this Court 
will normally accord particular deference to an agency 
interpretation of longstanding duration.”  Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, we conclude that the Contraceptive Mandate does not 
require coverage for abortion services and that Real 
Alternatives’s claim to the contrary fails. 
 
b.  Weldon Amendment 
                                              
14 In its brief, Real Alternatives relies on a number of 
dictionary definitions to suggest, contrary to statutory and 
regulatory definitions, that the modes of contraceptives 
covered by the Contraceptive Mandate are capable of 
inducing abortion.   
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Real Alternatives raises a similar claim based on the 
Weldon Amendment, which requires that no funds provided 
by the ACA’s underlying appropriations bill be made 
available to a federal agency or program that “subjects any 
institutional or individual health care entity to discrimination 
on the basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay 
for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.”  Pub. L. No. 
112-74, §§ 506, 507, 125 Stat. 786, 1111–12 (Dec. 23, 2011).  
This claim fails for the reasons stated in the preceding 
section.15 
c.  Church Amendment 
 The final APA claim asserts a violation of the Church 
Amendment, which prohibits an individual from being 
required to “perform or assist in the performance of any part 
of a health service program or research activity funded . . . by 
the Secretary of [HHS] if his performance or assistance . . . 
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral 
                                              
15 See also J.A. 51 (noting Representative Weldon’s 
statement when proposing the eponymous amendment:  “The 
provision of contraceptive services has never been defined as 
abortion in Federal statute, nor has emergency contraception, 
what has commonly been interpreted as the morning-after 
pill.  Now, some religious groups may interpret that as 
abortion, but we make no reference in this statute to religious 
groups or their definitions; and under the current FDA policy 
that is considered contraception, and it is not affected at all by 
this statute.”). 
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convictions.”16  42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d).  This claim fails for 
lack of standing.  The Real Alternatives Employees purchase 
their health insurance from a company in the health insurance 
market, not from HHS or an HHS-administered health 
insurance program that falls under the purview of the Church 
Amendment.  See Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 
402, 449–50 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (where individuals obtain 
health insurance through their employer, who in turn 
purchases coverage from the private health insurance market 
(and not HHS), the Church Amendment is not implicated) 
(citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).   
 
D.  RFRA 
 We now turn to the RFRA claim, which presents a 
question of first impression for this Court:  whether 
employees, who oppose contraceptives on religious grounds 
but work for secular employers, experience a substantial 
burden on their religious exercise when the Government 
regulates group health care plans and health care insurance 
providers by requiring them to offer health insurance 
coverage that includes coverage for services the employees 
find incompatible with their religious beliefs.  This claim is 
distinct from an employer’s RFRA claim objecting to the 
mandated provision of contraceptive services that was found 
                                              
16 The Church Amendment claim was brought only by the 
Real Alternatives Employees because the Church 
Amendment applies only to individuals.   
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to be meritorious in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).17   
 
 Under RFRA, the “Government may substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis 
added).  The “exercise of religion” constitutes “any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 
 Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), which overruled the earlier method of 
analyzing free exercise claims used in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972).  See Geneva, 778 F.3d at 430.  The earlier decisions 
used a balancing test that took into account whether the 
                                              
17 Echoing the District Court, we state what we consider to 
be obvious:  Hobby Lobby did not answer the RFRA question 
we confront today.  In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court 
found that an employer’s provision, not an individual’s 
maintenance, of coverage may violate RFRA.  134 S. Ct. at 
2778.  As they did before the District Court, the Real 
Alternatives Employees ignore this important distinction and 
attempt to stretch the holding of Hobby Lobby well beyond its 
factual confines.  The Dissent similarly misstates the 
applicability of Hobby Lobby, characterizing the issue there 
as “very like the one at issue here.”  Dissent Op. at 14.   
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challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the 
practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to 
serve a compelling governmental interest.  Id.  Smith rejected 
this test because applying it whenever a person objected on 
religious grounds to the enforcement of a generally applicable 
law “would open the prospect of constitutionally required 
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind . . . .”  494 U.S. at 888.   
 
Courts look to pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence 
when assessing RFRA claims.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2772.  The Supreme Court has characterized RFRA as 
“adopt[ing] a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional 
rule rejected in Smith.”  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).  
RFRA may be applied to situations not previously addressed 
under pre-Smith jurisprudence.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2772 (“It is simply not possible to read these provisions as 
restricting the concept of the ‘exercise of religion’ to those 
practices specifically addressed in our pre-Smith decisions.”). 
   
1.  Legal Standard 
 Religious exercise is impermissibly burdened when 
government action compels individuals “to perform acts 
undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious 
beliefs.”  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly:  
 
Where the state conditions receipt of an 
important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a 
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit 
because of conduct mandated by religious 
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belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on 
an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion 
exists.  
  
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) 
(emphasis added).  This Court has found “a substantial 
burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose 
between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting 
benefits otherwise generally available . . . versus abandoning 
one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a 
benefit; OR 2) the [G]overnment puts substantial pressure on 
an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs.”  Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 
286, 304 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
 Important principles circumscribe the RFRA inquiry, 
and it is for the reviewing court to determine whether a 
burden is “substantial.”  We thus reiterate a self-evident 
principle that we set forth in Geneva:  “While the Supreme 
Court reinforced in Hobby Lobby that we should defer to the 
reasonableness of the [RFRA claimant’s] religious beliefs, 
this does not bar our objective evaluation of the nature of the 
claimed burden and the substantiality of that burden on the 
[claimant’s] religious exercise.”18  778 F.3d at 436 (emphasis 
                                              
18 Although our judgment in Geneva was vacated by the 
Supreme Court, it nonetheless sets forth the view of our 
Court, which was based on Supreme Court precedent, that we 
continue to believe to be correct regarding our duty to assess 
substantiality as well as our conclusion that the regulation at 
issue there did not impose a substantial burden.  Cf. Zubik, 
136 S. Ct. at 1560 (specifying that vacatur and remand do not 
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added).  As such, “[w]hether a burden is ‘substantial’ under 
RFRA is a question of law, not a question of fact.”  Id. at 442 
(citing Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 
2011)); see also Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Accepting as true the factual allegations 
that [plaintiff’s] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature—
but not the legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegation, that 
his religious exercise is substantially burdened . . . .”); cf. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775 (“Because RFRA applies in 
these cases, we must next ask whether the HHS contraceptive 
mandate ‘substantially burden[s]’ the exercise of religion.”) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)) (alteration in original)). 
 
 RFRA’s legislative history underscores the 
requirement that the burden be substantial.  The version of 
RFRA initially introduced in the House of Representatives 
                                                                                                     
express the Supreme Court’s “view on the merits” of 
Geneva).  That judgment, and others cited here that addressed 
similar claims, was vacated because the Supreme Court 
wanted the parties to attempt—after the parties signaled they 
might be able—to develop a way for existing or modified 
ACA regulations to provide continued contraceptive coverage 
to petitioners’ employees and through petitioners’ insurers 
without any notice from petitioners.  Id.  Thus, Zubik vacated 
our judgment in Geneva but did not attack our reasoning.  
The Dissent mischaracterizes our holding today to be saying 
that Geneva is “controlling” for purposes of this case.  
Dissent Op. at 18.  That is not our position.  While Geneva is 
no longer controlling, there is nothing that would require us—
or anyone else—to conclude that our reasoning in that 
opinion was incorrect.   
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provided only that “Government shall not burden a person’s 
exercise of religion” unless the burden satisfied strict 
scrutiny.  H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 3 (1993).  It was only later 
in the enactment process that it was modified to include the 
word “substantially” immediately before “burden.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the 
Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“Congress added the word ‘substantially’ before passage to 
clarify that only some burdens would violate the act.  139 
Cong. Rec. S14352 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statements of 
Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Hatch). . . . If plaintiffs could assert 
and establish that a burden is ‘substantial’ without any 
possibility of judicial scrutiny, the word ‘substantial’ would 
become wholly devoid of independent meaning.”), vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561.  This 
important change made it explicit that RFRA would provide 
relief only from “substantial” government burdens on 
religious exercise, not from all government burdens.19  The 
                                              
19 See also Matthew A. Melone, Corporations and 
Religious Freedom:  Hobby Lobby Stores—A Missed 
Opportunity to Reconcile a Flawed Law with a Flawed 
Health Care System, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 461, 502–03 (2015) 
(“[T]he lack of any principled limitation on the meaning of 
religious exercise should prompt the courts to examine 
whether any burden on such exercise is substantial.  
Otherwise, RFRA becomes anarchical. . . . The notion that the 
judiciary has no business questioning the substantiality of a 
burden in this context is illogical.  The law imposes objective 
standards on beliefs in other contexts and appears to do so 
without inordinate difficulty. . . . Every person has the right to 
attach whatever religious meaning to act to an act their 
conscience demands.  The law, however, should not be 
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Dissent would have us read “substantial” out of the statute, 
revert to a never-enacted version of RFRA, and supplant our 
charge to conduct judicial review of a RFRA claim with 
automatic deference to the claimant.20  We will not.21 
                                                                                                     
hostage to the vagaries of the hypersensitive.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
20 For a persuasive discussion of the untenable 
consequences of the Real Alternatives Employees’ and 
Dissent’s theory of absolute deference to an allegation that a 
burden is substantial, see Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for 
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents 14–16, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) 
(Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-
191). 
21 The Dissent grounds its aversion to judicial review of 
substantiality in a Tenth Circuit dissent from the denial of en 
banc review in the Little Sisters case, and points to James 
Madison’s critique of the “notion that a civil judge can be a 
competent Judge of Religious Truth” for support.  Dissent 
Op. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Madison’s 
writings are indeed instructive, as our refusal today to permit 
a claimant’s bare allegations to automatically render a burden 
“substantial” is embedded in Madison’s Federalist No. 10:  
“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because 
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity.  With equal, nay with 
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and 
parties at the same time.”  The Federalist No. 10, 59 (James 
Madison).  
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 There is no substantial burden if the governmental 
action does not coerce the individuals to violate their religious 
beliefs or deny them the “rights, benefits, and privileges 
enjoyed by other citizens”—even if “the challenged 
Government action would interfere significantly with private 
persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to 
their own religious beliefs.”  Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.  Nor can 
a party use RFRA to “require the Government to conduct its 
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious 
beliefs of particular citizens.”  Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699.  
“Congress has required qualitative assessment of the merits of 
. . . RFRA claims.”  Geneva, 778 F.3d at 435.  At the same 
time, we must be careful to conduct only a review into the 
substantiality of the religious burden and not to question the 
reasonableness of the religious belief itself.  See Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (RFRA does not permit courts to 
address “whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case 
is reasonable”).  Courts are not to accept every allegation of 
substantial burden.  To the contrary, RFRA’s demand for 
judicial review has been recognized by the Supreme Court,22 
by this Court in Geneva, and by virtually all of our sister 
circuits, which have not hesitated to examine whether an 
alleged burden is sufficiently “substantial” under RFRA.23  
                                              
22 See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700–01 n.6 (“[F]or the 
adjudication of a constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather 
than an individual’s religion, must supply the frame of 
reference.”). 
23 See Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1176–77 (“RFRA’s 
statutory text and religious liberty case law demonstrate that 
courts—not plaintiffs—must determine if a law or policy 
substantially burdens religious exercise” and finding alleged 
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burden not “substantial.”) (emphasis added); Priests for Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Accepting the sincerity of plaintiffs’ 
beliefs, however, does not relieve this Court of its 
responsibility to evaluate the substantiality of any burden on 
plaintiffs’ religious exercise . . . .”), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561; E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. 
Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We begin and 
end our analysis with the substantial-burden prong.  The 
plaintiffs must show that the challenged regulations 
substantially burden their religious exercise . . . .”), vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561; Korte v. 
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013) (characterizing 
impermissible questions about the “centrality of the religious 
practice to the adherent’s faith” as distinct from the 
substantial burden inquiry, which “evaluates the coercive 
effect of the governmental pressure on the adherent’s 
religious practice and steers well clear of deciding religious 
questions”); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 
1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (characterizing the 
“crux” of the RFRA case as determining whether the 
Government “impose[d] a ‘substantial burden’ on the exercise 
of the Plaintiffs’ religion” and finding no substantial burden 
where Government sought to use artificial snow for skiing on 
a mountain sacred to Indian tribe claimant); Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(directly assessing whether claimant’s alleged religious 
burden was sufficiently substantial under RFRA and finding 
that it was not); see generally infra note 37.  But see Sharpe 
Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Humans Servs., 801 
F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[O]ur narrow function . . . in 
[the RFRA] context . . . is to determine whether the line 
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Rather than confront this precedent, our dissenting colleague 
would prefer to ignore the import, even the existence, of the 
“substantial” qualifier in the RFRA test.  The Dissent reduces 
our position to say that “[r]eligious beliefs are not being 
burdened in any meaningful sense, so people should just stop 
complaining.”  Dissent Op. at 2.  But whether the alleged 
burden is “meaningful”—or, more accurately, “substantial”—
is not a question that can be so easily dismissed with a 
reductionist turn of phrase.  To the contrary, it is the very 
essence of a RFRA claim, the threshold inquiry posed to any 
individual attempting to bring a successful RFRA claim, and 
it is undoubtedly for the court to answer whether it has been 
satisfied.24  Turning to the burden alleged by the Real 
Alternatives Employees, we will now do just that.  
                                                                                                     
drawn reflects an honest conviction.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration and omission in original)), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. v. CNS Int’l Ministries, 136 S. Ct. 
2006 (2016). 
24 Urging that we are wrongly questioning the “validity,” 
Dissent Op. at 10, and “legitimacy,” id. at 16, of the Real 
Alternatives Employees’ religious beliefs, the Dissent 
conflates our dual responsibilities in adjudicating a RFRA 
claim:  accepting the sincerity of a RFRA claimant’s religious 
belief and deciding whether the alleged burden is 
“substantial.”  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (noting 
that the RFRA presents the question of “whether the 
[Contraceptive Mandate] imposes a substantial burden” on 
the claimant, and not “whether the religious belief asserted . . 
. is reasonable”); Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1176 
(“[A]ccepting any burden alleged by Plaintiffs as ‘substantial’ 
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2.  Analysis 
 RFRA centers on the intersection between the specific 
conduct in which the objector is forced to engage and his or 
her religious exercise, and that is where we begin our 
analysis.  The Real Alternatives Employees characterize their 
purchase of insurance as somehow enabling the provision of 
contraceptives, thereby substantially burdening their religious 
exercise.  They allege that their “sincerely held religious 
beliefs prohibit them from [(1)] using, [(2)] supporting, or 
otherwise [(3)] advocating the use of abortifacients, or [(4)] 
participating in a health insurance plan that covers such items 
for themselves or their families.”  J.A. 123 (emphasis added).   
We address each enumerated allegation in turn, and we 
conclude that the Real Alternatives Employees have failed to 
demonstrate that the Contraceptive Mandate forces them to 
violate their religious beliefs.   
 
 The act complained of is the signing on to coverage 
followed by the request for reimbursement of services chosen.  
That basic scheme is the same for any individual whose 
employer provides him or her with insurance:  The plan 
deems the employee eligible to be reimbursed for hundreds of 
different services, and that employee can take advantage of 
that eligibility as he or she sees fit.  Should the employee opt 
to use a particular service, he or she fills out a form and asks 
to be paid back for costs incurred.  In the end, the employee 
uses a covered service, or not; either way, there is no 
                                                                                                     
would improperly conflate the determination that a religious 
belief is sincerely held with the determination that a law or 
policy substantially burdens religious exercise.”). 
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requirement to support or advocate for whatever service he or 
she, or others, selects.  Checking off a box to be eligible for 
reimbursement of services—services of the employee’s 
choosing—in no way indicates, let alone suggests, support or 
advocacy for that service.  The disconnect between the use of 
any one service and the use of contraceptives is arguably even 
greater—and it calls into question the “substantiality” of the 
purported burden.  After all, a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion exists only where the Government 
“demands that [an individual] engage in conduct that 
seriously violates [his or her] religious beliefs,” Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775 (emphasis added), and such 
engagement, as discussed in the following sections, is clearly 
lacking here.  
 
 We are then left with the fourth proscribed conduct 
that is central to the RFRA claim:  participation.  As with 
their equal protection claim, the Real Alternatives Employees 
rely primarily on March for Life for key support, as the 
district court there reasoned that “participating in” a health 
insurance plan, by its very nature, effects a substantial change 
in behavior because “health insurance does not exist 
independently of the people who purchase it.”  128 F. Supp. 
3d at 129.  There, the district court found that, “[g]iven the 
nature of health insurance, [employees] do play a role in the 
health care plans that provide contraceptive coverage.”  Id.  
While characterizing what employees do by subscribing to a 
plan as “playing a role,” March for Life would have us 
position this fact pattern in lockstep with Hobby Lobby.  But 
do employees really “play a role?”   The Real Alternatives 
Employees, along with the Dissent, assume the affirmative, 
relying on March for Life’s treatment of the concepts “buy 
 45 
 
into” and “participate in” as interchangeable.  But they are 
not.  
 
Subscribing to an insurance plan involves no real 
“participation,” just as there is no active “participation” when 
subscribing to a magazine or joining AARP or enrolling in a 
credit card that has membership benefits.  These are all 
packages that involve a one-time enrollment, followed by 
essentially passive eligibility for certain services that the 
member opts in or out of.  By declaring that an insurance plan 
does not exist without participants, the district court in March 
for Life somehow equates the plan with the employees as if 
they actively engage in a way that—were it factual—might be 
objectionable.  Let us be clear:  There is no “participation” in 
the real sense of the word.  The employee pays for coverage 
and thereby avails him or herself of the ability to be 
reimbursed for services.  But payment for the ability to have 
coverage does not give an employee an active “role” in the 
underlying plan.  The insurance company offers a package of 
health benefits, including certain benefits mandated by the 
Government.  The plan does not assure the availability of 
specific services.  Those services are for the employee to seek 
out and use—or not.  And the employee, by merely 
subscribing to that plan in the first instance, is even less 
directly related to whatever specific services he or she, or 
anyone else, might or might not use later on.25  The 
                                              
25 One could analogize that a bank does not “exist 
independently” of its individual accountholders, whose 
money the bank lends at interest in order to earn profit.  But 
the accountholders have no say in lending decisions (what 
rates to charge, which borrowers to lend to) and no direct 
control over the bank.  They, like a subscriber to an insurance 
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employees’ actions under the ACA are mediated by the 
insurance company, and any link between the decision to sign 
up for insurance on the one hand and the provision of 
contraceptives to a particular individual on the other is “far 
too attenuated to rank as substantial.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
 This attenuation is fatal to the RFRA claim.  Cases 
finding a substantial burden under RFRA have consistently 
done so where, unlike here, there is a burden that interfered 
with the claimants’ exercise and religion is directly 
implicated by federal action.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2751 (provision required employer-plaintiffs to provide 
                                                                                                     
plan, are offered a panoply of services that are 
predeterminately attached to whichever account (or plan) they 
choose.  Some are desirable to the accountholder and some 
are not.  Assume that the individual’s bank account is 
mandated by the Government under a privatized Social 
Security regime, for example.  If an accountholder had a 
religious objection to the bank’s practices—lending money at 
interest—we do not see how that accountholder could 
successfully vindicate his or her religious beliefs through 
RFRA.  So too in the context of health insurance, every 
participant pays a premium so that the health insurer will 
provide coverage, and every participant also receives (some 
of) the benefits of that coverage as they so choose.  But 
paying a premium simply is not equivalent to active 
participation—at a minimum, the insured employee has no 
say in what benefits the insurance company will offer or to 
whom—and “playing a role,” however important to the plan’s 
existence, does not automatically translate into experiencing a 
burden, let alone a substantial one.  
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contraceptive coverage in any group plan that they provided 
to their employees); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28 (1993) (ordinance 
prohibited plaintiffs from sacrificing animals); Lee, 455 U.S. 
at 254 (statute required plaintiffs to pay Social Security 
taxes); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712 (law denied plaintiff 
unemployment benefits); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–400 
(same); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207 (law required plaintiffs to 
send their children to school); see also Civil Liberties for 
Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 
2003), (holding, in the context of RLUIPA, that “a substantial 
burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears 
direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering 
religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable”), reh’g en 
banc denied; cf. Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965, 966 
(9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Petitioners have failed to 
establish that the [statutory provision at issue] places a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise under RFRA. . . 
. [T]he connection between [the statutory requirement and 
their religious exercise] is too attenuated to create a 
substantial burden on petitioners’ religious exercise.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 
These cases underscore that the connection between 
the conduct and the religious belief matters,26 for “the law 
                                              
26 While the Dissent urges that whether a burden is direct 
or indirect is no matter, even March for Life intimated 
otherwise.  Adopting Priests for Life, the District Court in 
March for Life stated that “it is true that [a]n asserted burden 
is also not an actionable substantial burden when it falls on a 
third party, not the religious adherent.”  128 F. Supp. 3d at 
129 (alteration in original).  It then reasoned:  “Even though 
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distinguishes between direct participation and remote 
facilitation, treating the former as compelling and the latter as 
negligible.”27  Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity:  
Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s 
Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1938 (2015).  The 
Government is not mandating an endorsement, or preventing 
someone from sacrificing an animal as part of a religious 
ritual, or anything of that nature.  The Contraceptive Mandate 
increases the number of choices an employee has when he or 
she purchases health insurance—in this case, broadening the 
availability of services that an employee might or might not 
access.  But that is all it is:  a choice.  It is still up to the 
employee to decide what to do with those options, to seek out 
relevant providers, to submit claims for reimbursement for the 
service he or she selects, and so on.  The act complained of—
the filling out of a form that triggers eligibility for 
reimbursement for services the employee chooses to use (or 
not)—has not changed, and it in no way amounts to the sort 
of “substantial” burden consistently found contrary to 
                                                                                                     
the plaintiffs are not the direct objects of the Mandate, they 
are [] very much burdened by it.”  Id.  By its own logic, 
March for Life acknowledged that directness matters in 
assessing whether there is an “actionable substantial burden,” 
but then found a different means (by erroneously focusing on 
participation) of concluding that plaintiffs were nonetheless 
“very much burdened.” 
27 See also Elizabeth Sepper, Substantiating the Burdens 
of Compliance, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 68 (noting 
that courts in multiple areas of law, including criminal law 
and torts, “evaluate[] burdens along a scale between 
directness and attenuation”). 
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RFRA.28  And the possibility that others might avail 
themselves of services that the employees find objectionable 
is no more burdensome than filling out the form in Geneva.29  
                                              
28 This point is particularly relevant in light of the Real 
Alternatives Employees’ allegation that the Contraceptive 
Mandate “fundamentally chang[es] the compensation package 
that can be offered to the individual employees.”  J.A. 123.  
That change, fundamental or not, still does not alter the nature 
of the conduct that the employees engage in when signing up 
for, or submitting a claim for reimbursement under, an 
insurance plan.  
29 The Dissent criticizes our consideration of how directly 
the burden affects the religious exercise and highlights the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Lyng that “indirect coercion or 
penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright 
prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.”  Dissent Op. at 26 (citing 485 U.S. at 450).  
But the Dissent ignores the remainder of that paragraph, 
which specifically warns against implying from that 
observation that “incidental effects of government programs, 
which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions 
but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting 
contrary to their religious beliefs, require [G]overnment to 
bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise 
lawful actions.”  485 U.S. at 450–51.  Subsequent appellate 
courts applying Lyng have heeded that advice.  Cf. Klem, 497 
F.3d at 279 (Lyng did not “hold that its conclusion must be 
read to mean that any incidental effect of a government 
program which may have some tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs 
satisfies the substantial burden standard.”).  
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Unlike in Hobby Lobby, which literally required the objecting 
employers to “arrange for” contraceptive coverage in a way 
that effectively amounted to sponsorship, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 
the Contraceptive Mandate requires nothing of the employees 
that implicates their religious beliefs as stated.  There is a 
material difference between employers arranging or providing 
                                                                                                     
The Dissent further aims to supplement its mistaken view 
of “substantial burden” by couching it in the context of the 
recent Supreme Court case Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (June 26, 2017), 
pointing to that decision as demonstrative of the idea that 
“laws that coerce religious claimants to disavow their religion 
in order to receive a government benefit[] are inconsistent 
with our constitutional traditions.”  Dissent Op. at 34.  But 
Trinity Lutheran has no real bearing on the specific question 
before us today.  As our dissenting colleague implicitly 
recognizes, Trinity Lutheran is not a RFRA case.  It dealt 
with a church’s constitutional challenge to a state program 
that automatically denied grants to any applicant owned or 
controlled by a religious entity.  137 S. Ct. at 2017.  “[T]he 
[state program’s] policy put[] Trinity Lutheran to a choice:  It 
may participate in an otherwise available benefit program or 
remain a religious institution.”  Id. at 2021–22.  The question 
before the Supreme Court addressed only the treatment of an 
institution based on its religious status, not the effect of a 
federal program on individual religious beliefs.  Signaling its 
intent to confine its holding to the particular facts and issue 
before it, the opinion noted:  “This case involves express 
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to 
playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious uses of 
funding or other forms of discrimination.”  Id. at 2024 n.3. 
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an insurance plan that includes contraception coverage—so 
that employees can avail themselves of that benefit—and 
becoming eligible to apply for reimbursement for a service of 
one’s choosing.30   
                                              
30 By contrast, “[t]he religious costs at issue in Hobby 
Lobby were generated by the owners’ direct participation in 
the purportedly wrong act—arranging and paying for the 
coverage of emergency contraception that they knew would 
be used by at least some employees and beneficiaries of their 
health plan.  While one might have argued, as Justice 
Ginsburg did, that the independent decisions of employees 
and beneficiaries to use contraception were something like 
‘intervening causes’ which cut off the owners’ responsibility, 
it is also reasonable to conclude that those third-party 
decisions are insufficient to terminate responsibility when 
owners’ themselves are required to arrange and (partially) pay 
for coverage of the objectionable contraceptives.”  Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens:  How Courts May 
(and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under 
RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 147 (2017) (footnotes 
omitted) (first emphasis added); see also Geneva, 778 F.3d at 
436–37 (“The issue of whether there is an actual burden was 
easily resolved in Hobby Lobby, since there was little doubt 
that the actual provision of services did not render the 
plaintiffs ‘complicit.’  And in Hobby Lobby, the Court came 
to its conclusion that, without any accommodation, the 
contraceptive coverage requirement imposed a substantial 
burden on the religious exercise of the for-profit corporations, 
because those plaintiffs were required to either provide health 
insurance that included contraceptive coverage, in violation 
of their religious beliefs, or pay substantial fines.”) (final 
emphasis added).  The contrast with this case, which the 
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The Real Alternatives Employees ultimately fail to 
grasp that one size does not fit all:  The fact that the 
Government may require insurers to offer coverage for 
expenditures for certain services that some might find 
objectionable on religious grounds cannot form the basis of 
requiring the Government to adjust its programs on behalf of 
all employees.  The categories of services that could offend 
religious beliefs is wide-ranging and, as discussed infra, 
denying reimbursement for such services to all on the basis of 
the religious objections of some would be neither desirable 
nor administrable.  It is certainly not mandated under RFRA, 
which has long protected against substantial, usually direct, 
burdens on the individual bringing the claim, not those utterly 
disconnected from the claimants themselves. 
 
In fact, the only behavior that the Contraceptive 
Mandate governs is the behavior of a third party, the insurer.  
And as Amici Curiae rightly note, RFRA does not afford the 
Real Alternatives Employees a “religious veto over 
governmental action that affects them only incidentally and 
does not coerce them to violate their faith.”  Amici Curiae Br. 
at 24.  This principle, that a RFRA claimant show that a 
penalty or benefit be more than incidental in order to amount 
to a substantial injury, is well-rooted in RFRA jurisprudence.   
In Lyng, the Supreme Court rejected the RFRA claimants’ 
                                                                                                     
Dissent fails to reconcile, is abundantly clear:  Whereas an 
employer fashioning a plan for employees and offering it to 
them might arguably signal approval of that plan and its 
contents, the employee’s act of signing up for a pre-defined 
health insurance plan that provides reimbursement for 
services that include contraceptive services does not. 
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free exercise claim because the injury only amounted to an 
incidental effect.  485 U.S. at 453.  The Court held that the 
indirect burden cases “cannot imply that incidental effects of 
government programs, which may make it more difficult to 
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to 
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious 
beliefs, require [G]overnment to bring forward a compelling 
justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”  Id. at 450–51.  
As discussed at length supra, in passing RFRA, Congress 
bolstered Lyng’s reading of the Free Exercise Clause with 
RFRA’s text31 and legislative history.32  We incorporated this 
logic in Geneva, finding that “free exercise jurisprudence 
instructs that we are to examine the act the [claimants] must 
perform—not the effect of that act—to see if it burdens 
substantially the [claimants] religious exercise,” 778 F.3d at 
440, and we reinforce that conclusion today.33   
                                              
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (“Government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section.”) (emphasis added). 
32 S. Rep. 103-111, 9 (1993) (“The act thus would not 
require such a justification for every government action that 
may have some incidental effect on religious institutions.”). 
33 Other courts have come to similar conclusions in 
various contexts.  Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 109–10 
(2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a currency’s slogan did not 
substantially burden the plaintiff’s free exercise rights); 
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that requiring some to receive a permit before 
engaging in a religiously mandated activity did not 
substantially burden their free exercise rights); Henderson v. 
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Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a law 
did not substantially burden people’s free exercise rights by 
preventing them from distributing religious shirts on the 
National Mall because they “can still distribute t-shirts for 
free on the Mall, or sell them on streets surrounding the 
Mall”); Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 
168, 172–73 (4th Cir. 1995) (“We find that the financial 
burden which the [RFRA claimants] must bear in order to 
provide [their son] with a cued speech interpreter at his 
private sectarian school does not constitute a substantial 
burden under RFRA.”); Smith by Smith v. Bd. of Educ., 844 
F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a school did not 
substantially burden a student’s free exercise rights by 
holding graduation on the Sabbath); Azeez v. Fairman, 795 
F.2d 1296, 1300 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that an 
administrative name change procedure did not substantially 
burden a prisoner’s free exercise rights); Friedman v. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 791 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that a county seal did not substantially burden the plaintiff’s 
free exercise of religion); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc., v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 
307–08 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that a local ordinance did not 
substantially burden a church’s free exercise rights by 
preventing the church from constructing a new church in just 
ten percent of a city); Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that an 
interscholastic athletic rule did not substantially burden the 
plaintiff’s free exercise rights by preventing him from 
competing in interscholastic high school sports for a year 
after a transfer); Berman v. Bd. of Elections, 420 F.2d 684, 
686 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding, in the alternative, that the 
Government did not substantially burden a voter’s free 
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 RFRA precedent further instructs that the Real 
Alternatives Employees’ requested remedy, lifting a penalty 
imposed on a third party—the insurer—would run afoul of 
this Court’s and others’ findings that individuals cannot use 
RFRA to compel the Government to structure its relations 
with a third party in a certain way.  “The Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the argument that an independent 
obligation on a third party can impose a substantial burden on 
the exercise of religion in violation of RFRA . . . .”  Geneva, 
778 F.3d at 440–41 (outlining cases); see also Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) 
(recognizing as “a fundamental principle of the Religious 
Clauses” that “[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no one the 
right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must 
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities”) 
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); E. 
Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“RFRA confers no right to challenge the independent 
conduct of third parties . . . .”), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561; Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 
246 (“[N]o RFRA right to be free from the unease, or even 
anguish, of knowing that third parties are legally privileged or 
obligated to act in ways their religion abhors.”); Ave Maria 
Found. v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d. 957, 965–66 (E.D. Mich. 
2014) (“[A] great number of religious objections based on 
third-party actions are dismissed simply because the plaintiff 
is not pressured to act in any way.”) (citing cases).  
 
                                                                                                     
exercise rights when it accommodated his religious 
opposition to voting in a church by allowing him to change 
voting districts and vote by absentee ballot). 
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 Before we end our discussion of the “substantial 
burden” inquiry under RFRA, we note that while the Dissent 
would downplay the workability concerns exposed by the 
District Court regarding the ramifications of finding a 
substantial burden here, we believe they are real.  As one 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals jurist observed, 
“contraceptive care is by no means the sole form of health 
care that implicates religious concerns.”  J.A. 66 (citing Grote 
v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., 
dissenting)).  Medical treatments that some might view as 
objectionable are as varied as they are numerous.  Examples 
that are by no means exhaustive include artificial 
insemination and other reproductive technologies; genetic 
screening and counseling; preventative and remedial 
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases; sex reassignment; 
vaccination; organ transplant from deceased donors; blood 
transfusions; euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide; and so 
on.  See id. (noting that “in some religions, virtually all 
conventional medical treatments[] are objectionable”).  By 
extension, “[a] finding that coverage for one set of 
objectionable services constitutes a substantial burden would 
imply that coverage for all such services imposes a substantial 
burden”—an implication that would “render the health care 
system totally unworkable.”  Id.; see also Navajo Nation, 535 
F.3d at 1072 (“[G]overnment simply could not operate if it 
were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and 
desires.”). 
 
 The Dissent parrots March for Life’s dismissal of these 
workability concerns, pointing to the incentives of insurance 
companies as safeguards against “a world in which the 
[G]overnment would require third-party insurance companies 
to provide coverage in every possible form requested by an 
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individual on religious grounds.”34  March for Life, 128 F. 
Supp. 3d at 132; see also Dissent Op. at 35–39.  But the 
incentives argument is off-point and not curative of our 
concerns.  The Dissent transplants March for Life’s 
discussion of insurance companies’ incentives—reviewed 
there in the context of deciding whether the Government 
satisfied the third “least restrictive” prong of the RFRA 
analysis—into its analysis of the first “substantial burden” 
prong.  And even if insurance companies’ incentives were 
relevant, they would still not satisfy our concerns.  The 
district court’s presumption in March for Life, the backbone 
of the Dissent’s rebuttal here, is that “[i]insurance companies 
have every incentive to maintain a sustainable and 
functioning market . . . .”  Dissent Op. at 37–38 (alteration in 
original) (quoting 128 F. Supp. 3d at 132).  This is a false 
premise:  Insurance companies have an interest in a 
sustainable and functioning insurance market only to the 
extent that it is profitable for them.35  Nor is the identification 
                                              
34 Gonzales, the only other case that the Dissent cites to 
address workability, said nothing about our concerns 
regarding the end-run on legislation that a ruling in favor of 
the Real Alternatives Employees would unleash.  See Dissent 
Op. at 35–36 (citing Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 436). 
35 The Dissent would prefer that “we leave to the 
insurance companies themselves the decision of what 
coverage options they can profitably provide.”  Dissent Op. at 
39.  By the Dissent’s logic, any regulation of any market is 
unnecessary because sellers in any market presumably have 
some interest in keeping that market functioning.  Why 
require car manufacturers to provide seatbelts if market 
demands will necessitate them anyway?  It is entirely within 
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of an insurance company that is allegedly willing to provide a 
satisfactory plan relevant to our analysis.  The RFRA test 
does not ask whether a claimant is able to offset a purported 
burden with an alternative scheme of his or her choosing, and 
neither the Real Alternatives Employees nor the Dissent have 
pointed to any case indicating otherwise.36  
 
 Our inquiry today urges an examination of the claimed 
substantial nature of an alleged burden.  This approach 
contrasts sharply with that of the district court in March for 
Life, which assumed—without any analysis whatsoever—the 
“substantial” nature of the so-called burden of “participating” 
in an insurance plan.  Id. at 129–30.  Yet we arguably need 
not even address the issue of whether the employee’s choice 
is coercive when the so-called burden of signing up for 
coverage that might enable themselves or others to be 
reimbursed for various services is clearly not substantial.  No 
matter how sincerely held their beliefs may be, we cannot 
accept at face value that subscribing to the plan imposes a 
“substantial burden.”  Surely the word “substantial” is a 
matter of subjectivity, not as to genuineness of belief but as to 
the nature and extent to which religious exercise is hampered 
or restrained by the conduct in question.  It is, after all, an 
imperative safeguard, else religious beliefs would invariably 
trump government action. 
 
                                                                                                     
the legislature’s prerogative to regulate an industry regardless 
of whether that industry may otherwise and on its own 
impose similar regulations.  
36 The existence of an alternative plan is only relevant to 
standing and questions of redressability.   
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 In characterizing the facts in an inaccurate manner, 
sidestepping the statutory text, legislative history, and 
controlling case law entirely, the Real Alternatives 
Employees urge us to put an active gloss on what is 
essentially a passive commercial monetary decision:  
enrolling in a plan so as to be reimbursed for services of 
which one later chooses to avail him or herself.  Viewing the 
situation for what it is compels us to conclude that whatever 
burden there might be, it is certainly not substantial. 
 
 Because we conclude that the Real Alternatives 
Employees have not—and cannot—show that the 
Contraceptive Mandate imposes a substantial burden on their 
religious beliefs, we need not reach the question of whether 
the Contraceptive Mandate is the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling governmental interest.37  
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Appellants’ motion for summary 
                                              
37 We note that the Dissent’s assertion that “[t]ime and 
again courts have rejected the regulation because it is not the 
least restrictive means of achieving its objective,” Dissent Op. 
at 4, is simply wrong, for only one case in addition to March 
for Life has addressed the precise question before us today.  
That case, Wieland v. United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (E.D. Mo. 2016), 
essentially adopted the reasoning of March for Life in finding 
for the RFRA claimants and did not perform a meaningfully 
distinct analysis. 
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judgment in its entirety and granting the Government’s cross-
motion for summary judgment in its entirety.  
1 
 
Real Alternatives, et. al. v. Burwell, et al., No. 16-1275 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part in the judgment 
and dissenting in part. 
 
Not so long ago, the idea of making nuns sign 
government documents they believe would involve them in 
grievous sins relating to life and death, or forcing devout 
Mennonites to pay for health insurance coverage for drugs 
and devices they view as abortifacients, would probably have 
been unthinkable in this country.  Then came the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, known variously as 
Obamacare, or the Affordable Care Act, or the ACA.  It has 
trailed in its wake a number of highly contentious lawsuits 
but none more intensely fought than the ones in which the 
government has sought to sweep aside the religious 
objections of individuals and organizations opposed to the 
portion of the ACA called the “Contraceptive Mandate.”  
That feature of the statute, which requires non-grandfathered 
group health care plans to include coverage for certain 
controversial contraceptive items, was at the center of the 
aforementioned disputes involving the nuns and the 
Mennonites.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged 
v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).  
And it is here for a return engagement in this case.   
 
 Having been beaten back in earlier efforts to force the 
Contraceptive Mandate on the populace, the government has 
changed its tune a bit – it has come up with a new rationale 
for its erratically aggressive enforcement of that feature of the 
ACA – but the song it sings is essentially the same: 
individuals whose faith prompts sincere opposition to paying 
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for or facilitating the purchase of contraceptives cannot be 
heard to object; the only thing legitimately at issue is the 
regulation of insurance markets.  According to the 
government, the Mandate has nothing to do with deep 
questions about the beginning of life, or the boundaries of 
moral culpability, or about faith and one’s obligations to God.  
Religious beliefs are not being burdened in any meaningful 
sense, so people should just stop complaining.  That is the 
line pressed by the United States Department of Justice, and it 
is the line accepted by my colleagues in the Majority, but I 
reject it. 
 
Even if this case could properly be characterized as 
nothing more than an examination of insurance markets, 
though, I could not agree with my friends in the Majority on 
the central point of the dispute.  They believe that citizens 
who buy health insurance are ciphers, that they do not have 
any “‘participation’ in the real sense of the word” when it 
comes to the coverage they sign up and pay for, and therefore 
the answer to the question “do employees really ‘play a role’” 
in the market for health care services is, according to my 
colleagues, a resounding no.  (Maj. Op. at 45.)  I disagree.  
After the federal government gave itself a vastly greater role 
in the health insurance market, there has no doubt been less 
room for decision making by individual purchasers.  But that 
does not mean that people were not meaningfully 
participating in the market before.  There were plans available 
that employers were free to sponsor, and employees were free 
to seek, that did not require payment for contraceptive 
coverage.  And there are still, as this record demonstrates, 
insurers who are ready, willing, and able to provide such 
plans again, if the government did not forbid it.  So, while it 
is true that individual choice has been drastically reduced by 
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the federal government, that subtraction of freedom cannot be 
a reason to say that government coercion of payment for 
unwanted contraceptive products – indeed, to some people, 
morally abhorrent products – is no burden on individuals.  
The circularity of the government’s and the Majority’s 
reasoning is stark. 
 
I do not disagree with every aspect of my colleagues’ 
decision.  The portion of the judgment that deals with the 
Equal Protection and Administrative Procedures Act claims 
of Real Alternatives, Inc. is sound.1  I write separately, 
however, to specify my disagreements with the Majority’s 
treatment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) claim brought by Real Alternatives’ employees 
Kevin I. Bagatta, Thomas A. Lang, and Clifford W. 
McKeown (the “Individual Plaintiffs”).  In my view, the 
Individual Plaintiffs have adequately pled and provided 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Contraceptive 
Mandate is a substantial burden on their free exercise of 
religion.2   
                                              
1 I do not agree in full with the reasoning the Majority 
employs for the APA claim, see infra footnote 4, but I do 
agree that precedent requires the result.  
 
2 In the District Court, the government asked either for 
dismissal or summary judgment.  The District Court accepted 
and perpetuated that ambivalence, granting the government’s 
motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment.  
The Majority Opinion treats the District Court opinion as 
solely granting summary judgment to the government.  As I 
see it, the government does not win either way; it loses either 
way.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To 
4 
 
Having reached that conclusion, I confront the 
question that the Majority avoids: whether the Contraceptive 
Mandate is narrowly tailored to support a compelling 
government interest.  The answer is no.  Time and again 
courts have rejected the regulation because it is not the least 
restrictive means of achieving its objective.  There are several 
other options the government could have chosen to enforce its 
regulation without impinging on the rights of religiously 
devout individuals.  For that reason, I respectfully dissent.  
 
I. Background  
 
The Individual Plaintiffs are full-time employees of 
Real Alternatives,3 a non-profit organization devoted solely 
“to promoting alternatives to abortion.”  (Opening Br. at 2.)  
All three men, their wives, and collectively seven minor 
children, are covered by Real Alternatives’ health insurance 
plan.   
 
                                                                                                     
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56 (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).  
The Individual Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim should survive.   
 
3 Bagatta serves as the President of Real Alternatives, 
Lang is the Vice President of Operations, and McKeown is 
the Vice President of Administration.   
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In addition to dedicating their professional lives to 
preventing abortion, the Individual Plaintiffs hold religious 
beliefs that honor life from conception.  It is undisputed that 
all three men are devout in their respective religious faiths – 
Bagatta and Lang are Catholics, and McKeown is an 
Evangelical Christian.  Among their sincerely held 
convictions, “[e]ach of the employees and their families 
believe that all human lives have full human dignity from the 
moment of conception/fertilization.”  (JA 99.)  That is the 
baseline, undisputed factual background upon which we are 
obligated to proceed.  The Individual Plaintiffs’ belief that 
life begins at conception entails the further belief “that they 
are prohibited from using, supporting, or otherwise 
advocating abortifacient drugs and devices, including IUD 
and any hormonal birth control method … .”  (JA 99.)   
 
The Contraceptive Mandate, promulgated under the 
ACA, requires non-grandfathered group health care plans to 
include coverage for the full range of FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods, which encompasses diaphragms, oral 
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, and drugs such as “Plan 
B” and “Ella.”4  (JA 6.)  The latter two are sometimes called, 
                                              
4 Grandfathered plans are defined as those that existed 
prior to March 23, 2010.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 18011(a), (e)).  They “need not comply with many of the 
[ACA’s] requirements, including the [C]ontraceptive 
[M]andate.”  Id.  As I indicated in dissent in Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of United States Department of 
Health & Human Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Jordan, J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), the 
6 
 
                                                                                                     
Mandate and related regulations were “not the product of any 
legislative debate” or “even the result of work within an 
administrative agency.”  Id. at 391 n.2.  They were drafted by 
the Institute of Medicine, a private entity that, as a result of 
the ACA’s complicated scheme “has ended up dictating 
regulations that the government insists override[] the 
[Individual Plaintiffs’] rights to religious liberty.”  Id. 
The Majority takes issue with whether the products 
and services covered by the Contraceptive Mandate include 
abortifacients.  See (Maj. Op. at 31-32).  While we may be 
bound to accept the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ definition of “abortifacients” for purposes of APA 
review, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) 
(holding – not without controversy – that courts must defer to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation so 
long as it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation” (citation omitted)), that is not true when we are 
considering the burden imposed on the Individual Plaintiffs’ 
exercise of their religious beliefs.  The Individual Plaintiffs 
are persuaded that life begins at conception and that, by 
definition, a drug or device that prevents implantation of a 
fertilized ovum is an abortifacient.  In other litigation, the 
government has admitted that some items covered by the 
Contraceptive Mandate can indeed prevent implantation.  
Brief of Respondent United States in Opposition to Cert., 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 
5740267 at *10 n.5 (filed October 21, 2013) (“Plan B, an 
emergency contraceptive, is a pill that works mainly by 
stopping the release of an egg from the ovary but may also 
work by preventing fertilization of an egg or by preventing 
attachment (implantation) to the womb (uterus). … Ella, 
another emergency contraceptive, is a pill that works mainly 
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respectively, the “morning-after pill” and the “week-after 
pill.”   (Id.)   
 
The Individual Plaintiffs currently elect to obtain their 
health insurance through their employer, Real Alternatives.  
Before the Mandate went into effect, Real Alternatives 
bought an insurance plan for its employees that did not 
contain contraceptive coverage.  Because of the 
Contraceptive Mandate, that plan is no longer available.  If 
the Individual Plaintiffs decide to decline coverage through 
their employer, the government requires them to obtain it in 
the open market, either independently or through “insurance 
exchanges,” which are organizations created pursuant to the 
ACA to facilitate the purchase of health insurance.  All the 
plans available on the open market – again because of the 
Contraceptive Mandate – contain coverage for the 
contraceptives.5  In other words, the government has declared 
that the Individual Plaintiffs must buy health insurance and, 
simultaneously, has made it impossible for them to purchase 
any coverage that conforms to their religious beliefs.   
 
Enforcement of the Contraceptive Mandate, however, 
is far from uniform.  The government has granted a great 
                                                                                                     
by stopping or delaying the ovaries from releasing an egg but 
may also work by changing the lining of the womb (uterus) 
that may prevent attachment (implantation).” (quotations and 
citation omitted)).  
  
5 According to the Verified Complaint, all available 
plans “will include all contraceptives, including 
abortifacients, and might also include surgical abortion.”  (JA 
114.) 
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many exceptions.  See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 
413 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (“By its own choice, the government has 
exempted an enormous number of employers from the 
Mandate, including ‘religious employers’ who appear to share 
the same religious objection as Conestoga and the Hahns, 
leaving tens of millions of employees and their families 
untouched by it.”).  As the District Court observed, this 
scheme of sporadic application has spawned “dozens of 
lawsuits … challeng[ing] both the Contraceptive Mandate and 
the dimensions of its exemptions.”  (JA 11.)  This is just the 
latest episode. 
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II.  Discussion6 
 
A. RFRA  
 
RFRA was enacted “to provide very broad protection 
for religious liberty.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.  It 
was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which upended 
                                              
6 As stated in the Majority Opinion, the District Court 
had jurisdiction and so do we.  See (Maj. Op. at 15 n.5).  The 
government conceded at oral argument that the Individual 
Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Mandate.  See 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
1275RealAlternativesInc,etalv.SecretaryDeptofHealthandHu
manServices,etal..mp3, at 22:32 (argued November 3, 2016) 
(counsel for the government recognizing that there “probably 
was standing”).  I agree.  But for the Mandate, the Individual 
Plaintiffs would be able to purchase a health plan that does 
not include the contraceptives to which they object.  Cf. 
March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 123 n.6 
(D.D.C. 2015) (“At the request of the Court, plaintiffs 
submitted a letter received from March for Life’s insurance 
carrier, CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield. The letter states that 
CareFirst would be willing to offer March for Life or its 
employees a plan omitting the contraceptive coverage that 
they are objecting to [i]f a legal exemption from [the 
Mandate] is obtained.” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)).  The Majority acknowledges this when they state 
that “[t]he existence of an alternative plan is … relevant to 
standing[.]”  (Maj. Op. at 58. n.36.)  
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decades of precedent by “virtually eliminat[ing] the 
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious 
exercise.”  Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 407 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)).  RFRA was 
supported by an “extraordinary ecumenical coalition in the 
Congress[,]” id., and has been hailed as “the most important 
congressional action with respect to religion since the First 
Congress proposed the First Amendment.”  Id.  (quoting 
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 209, 243 
(1994)).7  
 
Most importantly for present purposes, RFRA restored 
in religious liberty cases “the judicial standard of review 
known as ‘strict scrutiny,’ which is ‘the most demanding test 
known to constitutional law.’”  Id. at 408 (quoting City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997)).  According to 
RFRA, the government is generally forbidden to 
“substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”  42 
                                              
7 The Majority focuses its telling of this history on 
Smith’s rejection of a test that allowed broad protection for 
religious liberty.  See (Maj. Op. at 35 (quoting Smith, 494 
U.S. at 888 for the proposition that a balancing test “would 
open the prospect of constitutionally required religion 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind”)).  That misses the key point that RFRA 
was passed for the very purpose of overruling Smith to the 
fullest extent of Congress’s power.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb(b) (declaring that the purpose of RFRA was “to 
restore the compelling interest test” from pre-Smith 
jurisprudence).  
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U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).  If the government does substantially 
burden an individual’s exercise of religion, then that 
individual is entitled to an exemption from the government 
action, unless the government can show that the “application 
of the burden to the person-- (1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”  
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  No one disputes that the strict 
scrutiny required by RFRA applies to the Contraceptive 
Mandate, if the Mandate substantially burdens religious belief 
and practice.8 
 
B.  Substantial Burden 
 
The Majority says that the Individual Plaintiffs have 
not demonstrated a substantial burden on their religious 
beliefs, but my colleagues reach that conclusion by a route 
that amounts to questioning the validity of those beliefs – an 
indulgence that we are forbidden.  The Supreme Court has 
made it clear that, when applying RFRA and analyzing a 
burden on religion, our role is confined.  “[F]ederal courts 
have no business addressing … whether the religious belief 
asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable … .”  Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2778 (internal quotations omitted); cf. Smith, 
                                              
8 RFRA as passed by Congress also applied to the 
States, but, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 
(1997), the Supreme Court held that the attempt to apply the 
statute to the States exceeded Congress’s power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 (discussing City of Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 533-34.) 
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494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, 
we have warned that courts must not presume to determine 
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility 
of a religious claim.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t 
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (recognizing that “it is 
not for us to say that the line [a religious observer] drew was 
an unreasonable one” and that courts cannot “dissect religious 
beliefs”).  Instead of weighing the reasonableness of deeply-
held religious convictions (and inevitably passing judgment 
on their value), we have a “narrow function.”  Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2779.  We ask only “whether the line drawn [by 
the adherent] reflects an honest conviction.”  Id.  (citation 
omitted).    
 
Once we have determined that an adherent has an 
honest conviction, we ask if the government regulation 
imposes a substantial burden on adherence to that conviction.  
In this instance, we must decide “whether the [Contraceptive] 
[M]andate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the 
objecting parties to [live] in accordance with their religious 
beliefs[.]”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.  A “substantial 
burden” exists where: (1) “a follower is forced to choose 
between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting 
benefits otherwise generally available to other [persons] 
versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order 
to receive a benefit”; or (2) “the government puts substantial 
pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs.”  Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 
272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 
 The Individual Plaintiffs attest in their Verified 
Complaint that paying for insurance coverage for 
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contraception violates their religious beliefs.9  See Verified 
Complaint at ¶ 46 (JA 99-100) (“[T]he Real Alternatives 
employees and their families object, on the basis of their 
sincerely held ethical and religious beliefs, to participating in, 
and/or paying a portion of the premium for, a health insurance 
plan which provides coverage for objectionable items for 
themselves and their family members.”).  Because of the 
Contraceptive Mandate, they are faced with two choices: 
purchase a plan with the offending coverage (either through 
their employer or on the exchanges) or decline to purchase a 
plan, face a tax penalty, and leave their families uninsured.  
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (codifying the ACA’s individual 
mandate which requires individuals without employer-
coverage to purchase insurance or pay a penalty).  
Notwithstanding the Majority’s protestations to the contrary, 
that is a prime example of a substantial burden on religion.  It 
manages to satisfy both of the alternative tests for a 
substantial burden: a believer is forced to choose whether to 
follow the precepts of his religion and be penalized by the 
government, or to abandon his convictions,10 and the 
                                              
9 A Verified Complaint is treated as an affidavit in the 
summary judgment posture.  See, e.g., Reese v. Sparks, 760 
F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating a verified complaint as an 
affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).    
 
10 Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates that the 
imposition of a government penalty is at least as onerous as 
the withholding of a government benefit.  See Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2775 (noting that it had “little trouble 
concluding” that forcing plaintiffs to choose between 
honoring their religious convictions or facing severe 
economic penalties was a substantial burden).     
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“government [thus] puts substantial pressure on [the follower] 
to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his 
beliefs.”  Washington, 497 F.3d at 280.  
 
The Supreme Court has long since declared that a 
Hobson’s choice like the one forced upon the Individual 
Plaintiffs is indeed a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion.  See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (“More tha[n] 30 years 
ago, the Court held that a person may not be compelled to 
choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and 
participation in an otherwise available public program.”).  
And that principle remains in full force today.  See Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 
2012, 2021-22 (2017) (finding a burden on religion under the 
Free Exercise clause where a state statute required a church to 
choose between “participat[ing] in an otherwise available 
benefit program or remain[ing] a religious institution”).  It 
reflects an understanding that predates RFRA but rings 
throughout the statute.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
404 (1963) (finding a burden on a plaintiff where a state 
unemployment law “force[d] her to choose between following 
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in 
order to accept work, on the other hand”); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (finding a substantial burden 
where a “Wisconsin [compulsory education] law 
affirmatively compel[led] [the plaintiffs] under threat of 
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with 
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs”).  The avoidance 
of such dilemmas is a key purpose of RFRA.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb(b) (stating that a purpose of RFRA is “to provide a 
claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by [the] government”).   
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Hobby Lobby considered in depth whether the 
Contraceptive Mandate imposed a substantial burden on 
religiously devout persons who were being forced to make a 
choice very like the one at issue here.11  134 S. Ct. at 2775-
77.  In that case, “family-run businesses” whose owners had 
strongly-held religious beliefs against contraception were 
forced to face severe economic fines if they chose to honor 
their beliefs.12  Id.  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
                                              
11 The Majority asserts that my saying the decisions 
faced by the employers in Hobby Lobby and the employees 
here are similar “misstates the applicability of Hobby 
Lobby[.]”  (Maj. Op. at 34 n.17.)  Not so.  The comparison is 
apt because the claimants in Hobby Lobby and the Individual 
Plaintiffs in this case were both forced by the United States to 
take nearly-identical action: purchase of and participation in a 
plan that covers a form of contraception that they believe is 
antithetical to the sanctity of life.  
 
12 The Supreme Court also rejected an argument made 
by the government that the plaintiffs could avoid the 
substantial burden by simply declining to provide health 
insurance to their employees.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2777 (“We doubt that the Congress that enacted RFRA – or, 
for that matter, ACA – would have believed it a tolerable 
result to put family-run businesses to the choice of violating 
their sincerely held religious beliefs or making all of their 
employees lose their existing healthcare plans.”).  Here, the 
burden is likewise substantial because the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ only alternative to purchasing the offending 
insurance plans is to forego insurance and pay the associated 
penalty. 
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“[b]ecause the Contraceptive Mandate forces them to pay an 
enormous sum of money … if they insist on providing 
insurance coverage in accordance with their religious beliefs, 
the [M]andate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those 
beliefs.”13  Id. at 2779. 
 
Two other courts have considered the precise question 
before us today: whether the Mandate imposes a substantial 
burden on the exercise of religious beliefs when individuals 
are required to purchase insurance coverage through their 
employer or on the open market, and all available plans 
(because of government action) are required to contain 
coverage at odds with those individuals’ faith.  Both courts 
held that the Contraceptive Mandate does, in that context, 
impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.  In 
March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 130 (D.D.C. 
2015), the court said “[e]mployee plaintiffs are … caught 
between the proverbial rock and a hard place: they can either 
buy into and participate in a health insurance plan that 
includes the coverage they find objectionable and thereby 
violate their religious beliefs, or they can forgo health 
insurance altogether and thereby subject themselves to 
penalties for violating the ACA’s individual mandate.”  
Similarly, in Wieland v. United States Department of Health 
& Human Services, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1017 (E.D. Mo. 
                                              
13 The immediate financial cost to the employees is 
less here, but not insignificant. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A 
(imposing a penalty of the higher of either 2.5% of household 
income or $695/adult and $347.50/child, the latter capped at 
$2,085).  Of course, that cost does not account for the very 
serious risk that must be absorbed if one is forced to go 
without health insurance.  
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2016), the court observed that the Mandate’s “ultimate impact 
is that Plaintiffs must either maintain a health insurance plan 
that includes contraceptive coverage, in violation of their 
sincerely-held religious beliefs, or they can forgo healthcare 
altogether, which will result in the imposition of significant 
penalties (not to mention the potentially crippling costs of 
uninsured health care).”  
 
The Majority here, though, sees things differently.  It 
claims that the Contraceptive Mandate cannot possibly 
impose a substantial burden on anyone, relying on six general 
arguments to bolster that conclusion.  Those reasons, 
however, look like nothing more than a rejection of where the 
Individual Plaintiffs’ consciences have led them to draw the 
line against being complicit in what their religions tell them is 
wrong.  It is the legitimacy of their conscientious religious 
objections that my colleagues call into question, contrary to 
the explicit direction of the Supreme Court.  See Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2778 (refusing to delve into “difficult and 
important question[s] of religion and moral philosophy”).  
 
 1.  The Precedential Effect of Geneva  
   College 
 
First, the Majority relies on the now-vacated decision 
of our court in Geneva College v. Secretary, United States 
Department of Health & Human Services, 778 F.3d 422 (3d 
Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), to emphasize that courts can, and 
should, assess the substantiality of a claimant’s asserted 
burden.  In that case, a panel considered the religious 
exemption to the Mandate and determined that requiring non-
profit religious employers to register their objection to the 
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Contraceptive Mandate by filling out a form was not a 
substantial burden under RFRA.  See id. at 442 (“Because we 
find that the self-certification procedure does not cause or 
trigger the provision of contraceptive coverage, appellees are 
unable to show that their religious exercise is burdened.”).  
That opinion was deprived of any precedential effect by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct at 
1561.  Nevertheless, the Majority contends that Geneva is 
persuasive and was not vacated because it was incorrect.  
(Maj. Op. at 37 n.18.)  I have my doubts about Geneva’s 
reasoning,14 but no doubt that it is not controlling.15  
                                              
14 The opinion in Geneva reflects, I think, an admirable 
effort to explain why the form-filling exercise should not give 
the faithful concern that they are complicit in actions contrary 
to their religion.  But there is a different and persuasive 
discussion in the dissent from the order denying rehearing en 
banc review in the Tenth Circuit in Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 
2015) (Hartz, J., dissenting) (“When a law demands that a 
person do something the person considers sinful, and the 
penalty for refusal is a large financial penalty, then the law 
imposes a substantial burden on that person’s free exercise of 
religion.  All the plaintiffs in this case sincerely believe that 
they will be violating God’s law if they execute the 
documents required by the government.  And the penalty for 
refusal to execute the documents may be in the millions of 
dollars.  How can it be any clearer that the law substantially 
burdens the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion?”). 
 
15 In claiming that I mischaracterize their argument, 
my colleagues agree that Geneva is not controlling and lacks 
precedential force.  (Maj. Op. at 37 n.18.) (“Geneva is no 
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longer controlling[.]”).  But the Majority claims that “Zubik 
vacated our judgment in Geneva but did not attack the 
reasoning” and suggests that the Supreme Court’s vacatur has 
no impact on “the view of our Court” as set forth in that case.  
(Id.)  It is inaccurate to claim that a vacatur has no effect on 
the strength of an opinion – indeed, we have repeatedly 
emphasized in our case law that, when an opinion is vacated, 
“it carries no precedential force.”  1621 Route 22 W. 
Operating Co., LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 825 F.3d 
128, 141 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Leader v. Apex Hosiery 
Co., 108 F.2d 71, 81 (3d Cir. 1939) (holding that a decree 
considered to be vacated “is no longer binding as a precedent, 
as the law of the case, or as res judicata”).  Other Circuits are 
in general agreement on this point.  See, e.g., Durning v. 
Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting 
an argument that a decision still had precedential value 
because it was vacated on alternative grounds because while 
“[a] decision may be reversed on other grounds … a decision 
that has been vacated has no precedential authority 
whatsoever”).  The Majority cites no case law for the 
extraordinary proposition that an appellate court’s reasoning 
and judgment, after it has been vacated by the Supreme 
Court, should carry weight in future cases, especially when 
applied to litigants who were not parties to the original 
dispute.   
Geneva’s holding was vacated after the Supreme Court 
received supplemental briefing indicating that the government 
and non-profit religious employers could potentially reach a 
compromise position that did not infringe on the rights of the 
latter.  See Zubik, 136 S. Ct at 1560 (“Given the gravity of the 
dispute and the substantial clarification and refinement in the 
positions of the parties, the parties on remand should be 
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But even if Geneva were binding or persuasive 
precedent, it does not lead to the result the Majority reaches 
in this case.  There are significant factual differences between 
the burdens alleged in Geneva and those at issue here.  
Notably, the panel in Geneva reasoned that the claimed 
burden – the requirement to fill out and file a form – was 
actually a means to register and affirm the employer’s 
objection to providing contraceptive coverage.  See Geneva, 
778 F.3d at 438-39 (“If anything, because the appellees 
specifically state on the self-certification form that they object 
on religious grounds to providing such coverage, it is a 
declaration that they will not be complicit in providing 
coverage.”).  According to Geneva, filling out the form was, 
in effect, the organization’s chance to “wash[] its hands of 
any involvement in contraceptive coverage[,]” leaving it to 
“the insurer and the third party administrator [to] tak[e] up the 
slack under compulsion of federal law.”  Id. at 441 (internal 
quotation omitted).16  Here, the Individual Plaintiffs are 
                                                                                                     
afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going 
forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise 
while at the same time ensuring that women covered by 
petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal coverage, 
including contraceptive coverage.’” (citation omitted)).  Thus, 
the Supreme Court did not in any way endorse the conclusion 
that the college did not face a substantial burden under 
RFRA.  See id. (“[T]he Court does not decide whether 
petitioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened 
… .”)   
 
16 The response to that reasoning, of course, is that 
saying something does not make it so.  If the government says 
“file this paperwork so that we can give abortifacients to your 
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compelled to do much more than fill out and file a form.  Far 
from distancing themselves from the objectionable coverage, 
the Individual Plaintiffs are forced to sign up and pay for it, 
unless they want themselves and their families to be 
uninsured and to pay fines.  They must actually provide 
financial support for the objectionable contraceptive 
coverage, just like the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby.  The 
Majority does nothing to address that distinction between 
Geneva and this case. 
 
2.  Using, Supporting, or Advocating the  
  Use of Contraceptives 
 
The Majority next turns to the words of the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, where they object to “using, 
supporting, or otherwise advocating, the use of abortifacients, 
or participating in a health insurance plan that covers such 
items for themselves or their families.” (Verified Compl. 
¶ 158.)17  The Majority first claims that signing up for an 
                                                                                                     
employees,” it may not help to add “and don’t worry, you will 
not be complicit in what’s going to happen as soon as you file 
that paperwork.” 
   
17 The Majority ignores this statement of the Individual 
Plaintiffs in their Verified Complaint defining their burden: 
“the Real Alternatives employees and their families object, on 
the basis of their sincerely held ethical and religious beliefs, 
to participating in, and/or paying a portion of the premium 
for, a health insurance plan which provides coverage for 
objectionable items for themselves and their family 
members.”  See Verified Complaint at ¶ 46.  That particular 
iteration of the burden focuses on the financial aspect of 
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insurance plan that covers contraceptive coverage does not 
involve the “use, support, or advocacy of contraceptives” 
because “[c]hecking off a box to be eligible for 
reimbursement of services … of the employee’s choosing … 
in no way indicates, let alone suggests, support or advocacy 
for that service.”  (Maj. Op. at 44.)  That conclusion relies on 
the Majority’s perception of how insurance coverage works:  
 
The plan deems the employee eligible to be 
reimbursed for hundreds of different services, 
and that employee can take advantage of that 
eligibility as he or she sees fit.  Should the 
employee opt to use a particular service, he or 
she fills out a form and asks to be paid back for 
costs incurred.  In the end, the employee uses a 
covered service, or not; either way, there is no 
requirement to support or advocate for whatever 
service he or she, or others, selects. 
 
(Id.) 
 
As my colleagues see it, because the Individual 
Plaintiffs can elect not to use the covered contraceptives, they 
are not burdened by having to pay for the coverage.  The 
message is “get over it.”  And that seems to me to be only a 
“thinly-veiled attack” on sincerely-held religious beliefs.  
                                                                                                     
paying into a plan that supports contraceptive services.  The 
Majority has completely ignored the financial consequences 
of the Mandate, so it is perhaps not surprising that they have 
chosen to attend solely to a portion of the Complaint that does 
not mention those consequences.  
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March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 129.  When the Individual 
Plaintiffs say in their Verified Complaint that it is at odds 
with their religious beliefs to purchase a plan which uses their 
money to offer products and services they believe to be 
morally abhorrent, I think we are supposed to believe them.  
 
 And we should, because their concern that their money 
will be used to support contraceptives is perfectly logical.  It 
is the Majority’s characterization of how the insurance market 
functions that is confused.  It overlooks two essential truths: 
money is fungible and insurance is based on the pooling of 
risk.  Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2585 (2012) (The requirement that everyone must 
purchase health insurance “forces into the insurance risk pool 
more healthy individuals, whose premiums on average will be 
higher than their health care expenses.  This allows insurers to 
subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals the 
[ACA] reforms require them to accept.”).  In the 
government’s own words, the system “works through ‘risk 
pooling in the group market’ which ‘results in sharing … 
costs … across an entire plan or employee group.’”  
(Responding Br. at 23-24 (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. at 41,730).)  
Thus even when the Individual Plaintiffs elect not to use 
contraceptive coverage, they still pay for and thus support it.  
See id. at 24 (noting that the plans “cover a wide array of 
services … [and insurers] set rates based on standardized 
policies [that] ensure[] that medical costs are spread across 
the entire pool of plan beneficiaries”).  It is peculiar, then, for 
the Majority to claim that purchasing an insurance plan that 
includes contraception “does not assure the availability of 
specific services.”  (Maj. Op. at 45.)  While an individual 
must seek out and use a particular service, the point of health 
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insurance is in fact to help facilitate and support access to 
each service for everyone in the risk pool.   
 
 Taken to its logical conclusion, my colleagues’ 
position means that the Contraceptive Mandate could only be 
a “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion if the 
government forced religious objectors not only to buy plans 
with contraceptive coverage, but also to buy the covered 
contraceptives.  That idea was rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Hobby Lobby, when it determined that providing coverage 
to employees, who may or may not elect to use the 
contraceptive coverage, was a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion.18  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 
(“The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage 
demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the 
destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it 
immoral for them to provide the coverage.”).  The Majority 
here may prefer the position taken by the dissent in Hobby 
Lobby, see 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I 
                                              
18 The Majority makes an artificial distinction and says 
that while the Contraceptive Mandate “requires nothing of the 
employees that implicates their religious beliefs” the Mandate 
did affect the employers in Hobby Lobby because it “literally 
required” them to “‘arrange for’ contraceptive coverage in a 
way that effectively amounted to sponsorship.”  (Maj. Op. at 
51 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775)).  That 
purported difference is meaningless – in both Hobby Lobby 
and here the claimants were forced to financially support 
others’ use of contraceptives, an action that was antithetical to 
their religious beliefs.  As in Hobby Lobby, “it is not for us to 
say [whether] the[] religious beliefs are mistaken or 
insubstantial.”  134 S. Ct. at 2778.   
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would conclude that the connection between the families’ 
religious objections and the contraceptive coverage 
requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial.  The 
requirement carries no command that Hobby Lobby or 
Conestoga purchase or provide the contraceptives they find 
objectionable.”), but that was the losing argument, as it 
should have been. 
 
  3. Participating in a Plan    
   Containing Contraceptives 
 
 The Majority next focuses its attention on the 
Individual Plaintiffs’ claim that participating in a health 
insurance plan containing coverage for contraceptives is a 
substantial burden on their free exercise.  In doing so, my 
colleagues reduce the Individual Plaintiffs to non-entities in 
the calculus of harm.  The Majority’s argument is that the 
Individual Plaintiffs do not meaningfully “participate” in the 
acquisition of their health insurance coverage, so the market 
regulation forcing all but exempt plans to carry contraceptive 
coverage cannot be a substantial burden on them.  There is, 
however, no sound legal or logical foundation for that 
position.   
 
 To begin, the Majority claims that there is no “active 
‘participation’” by an individual in subscribing to an 
insurance plan.  (Maj. Op. at 45.)  Their argument is that the 
concepts of “buy into” and “participate in” are not 
“interchangeable[,]” therefore when individuals purchase an 
insurance plan, they do not participate in it.  (Id.)  This is a 
semantic distinction without difference.  And even assuming 
that the “active” participation requirement had a basis in our 
case law (which it does not), being an insurance plan 
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participant should fit the bill.  “[H]ealth insurance does not 
exist independently of the people who purchase it,” March for 
Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 129, and the purchasers are not 
designated by the insurers as “plan participants” for nothing.  
As already explained, the Individual Plaintiffs are not simply 
paying for the services they elect to use; they are participants 
in a plan that pools risk and provides comprehensive 
coverage.  They are paying for all services, even those they 
individually decline to use, thus their participation in the plan 
directly subsidizes the use of contraceptives.  That is hardly 
“remote facilitation.”  (Maj. Op. at 48) (citation omitted).  
What’s more, the Majority completely ignores that 
“participation” in the insurance market is compelled – and 
enforced with a significant monetary penalty.19  Being 
required to associate with and subsidize an organization or 
activity that one disagrees with does indeed impose a 
substantial burden on religion.  
 
 The Majority also makes a nearly identical argument 
using a slightly different term – directness.  But, deploying a 
synonym does not improve the argument that the Individual 
Plaintiffs can be ignored as playing no “active ‘role’” in their 
                                              
19 By ignoring the fact that the Individual Plaintiffs are 
forced to buy health insurance, the Majority attempts to make 
the central question whether or not a health insurance 
purchaser meaningfully “participates” in their insurance plan.  
But that is not the question RFRA asks.  The proper inquiry is 
whether government action substantially burdens religion.  
Where the “participation” is abhorrent to the claimants’ 
religion – and it is compelled – it should be plain that their 
religious exercise is substantially burdened.  
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health plans.  (Maj. Op. at 45.)  Even if the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ burden or participation could rightly be 
characterized as “indirect” in some way, nothing requires a 
burden to be “direct” to be cognizable under RFRA.  See 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 
450 (1988) (“It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that 
indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, 
not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the 
First Amendment.”).20 
                                              
20 The Majority chides me for not including a fuller 
quotation in the parenthetical to this citation to Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 
439 (1988).  (Maj. Op. at 49-50 n.29.)  But the Supreme 
Court itself, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer, recently relied on Lyng for that precise principle, 
noting that “the Free Exercise clause protects against ‘indirect 
coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just 
outright prohibitions.’”  137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) 
(quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450).  
Also, according to my colleagues, the March for Life 
opinion that they spend so much time belittling actually 
supports them on the significance of “direct vs. indirect” 
burdens.  But in the quotation the Majority borrows, the 
March for Life opinion simply acknowledged the fact that the 
Contraceptive Mandate regulated insurers in the first instance.  
See March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (noting that 
individuals are not “the direct objects” of the Contraceptive 
Mandate).  That does not mean that purchasers are unaffected.  
In reality, the labels “direct” and “indirect” are too malleable 
to be of any real use in this context.  By regulating the types 
of plans insurance companies can offer, and then forcing 
individuals to purchase those plans, the government is, in a 
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My colleagues also draw a number of analogies in an 
effort to demonstrate why this case does not involve a 
substantial burden.  None ring true.  They hypothesize 
someone alleging a substantial burden when subscribing to a 
magazine, or joining an organization, or acquiring a credit 
card.  According to the Majority, “there is no active 
‘participation’” in any of these scenarios because “[t]hese are 
all packages that involve a one-time enrollment, followed by 
essentially passive eligibility for certain services that the 
member opts in or out of.”  (Maj. Op. at 45.)  My colleagues 
again completely ignore that purchasing health insurance in 
the era of the ACA is far from voluntary – it is compelled and 
enforced with a monetary fine.  Their examples are therefore 
meaningless.  Of course subscribing to a magazine would be a 
substantial burden under RFRA if it were abhorrent to the 
subscriber’s religious beliefs and were forced upon him by 
the government.21  The same is true for compelled 
membership in an organization.  
                                                                                                     
very real sense, directly acting on individuals.  Moreover, the 
Majority has ignored the rest of the discussion in March for 
Life, which lays out why the Mandate is a substantial burden.  
See id. (“While it is true that an asserted burden is also not an 
actionable substantial burden when it falls on a third party, 
not the religious adherent … health insurance does not exist 
independently of the people who purchase it.” (internal 
citations and quotations omitted)).  
 
21 Jefferson was right: “to compel a man to furnish 
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which 
he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”  Abood v. Detroit Bd. 
of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977) (quoting I. Brant, 
James Madison: The Nationalist 354 (1948)). 
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The credit card and banking analogy fares no better.  
My colleagues say that, as in the insurance market, 
“accountholders [at a bank] have no say in lending decisions 
(what rates to charge, which borrowers to lend to) and no 
direct control over the bank.”  (Maj. Op. at 46 n.25.)  
Accordingly, if we were to “[a]ssume that the individual’s 
bank account is mandated by the Government under a 
privatized Social Security regime” and “an accountholder had 
a religious objection to the bank’s practices” such as “lending 
money at interest[,]” that accountholder could not 
“successfully vindicate his or her religious beliefs through 
RFRA.”  (Id.)  I disagree.  In that hypothetical, it would 
undoubtedly impose a substantial burden on religion to force 
such believers to put their money into an interest bearing 
account contrary to their religious beliefs. 22  The 
consequence of determining that there was a substantial 
burden would not be to prevent the government from 
instituting a privatized Social Security regime.  The 
consequence would be to force the government to satisfy 
strict scrutiny before forcing the religious objector to 
                                                                                                     
 
22 Those who desire to follow prohibitions on usury in 
the Torah and Quran often avoid traditional banking or enter 
into alternative arrangements with banks.  See, e.g., Naureen 
S. Malik, Interest-Free Financing for U.S. Muslims, ABC 
News http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87070 
(explaining that there are two relevant Islamic prohibitions, 
“[o]ne against the use of ribaa or ribit, also known as usury; 
and the other against gharar, the unbundled sale of risk, such 
as gambling, insurance or derivatives[,]” and noting that 
banks will offer alternative arrangements to comply with 
those prohibitions).   
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participate.23  See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 
(1982) (analyzing whether Social Security satisfied strict 
scrutiny with respect to an Amish objector).   
                                              
23 The Majority’s analogies are troubling not only 
under RFRA, but also under the Constitution.  See W. 
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein.”).  The proposals suggested by the 
Majority would violate the First Amendment in more ways 
than one.  In the association context, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly found that being forced to subsidize and affiliate 
with an organization one disagrees with clearly burdens 
freedom of association and expression, even when the cost of 
membership is de minimis and there is no additional 
requirement to participate.  See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. 
Ct. 2618, 2639, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (2014) (striking down 
compelled labor union membership requirements); Keller v. 
State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 6, (1990) (finding 
mandatory bar dues that were used for ideological or political 
educational programs violated the First Amendment).  
Likewise, free speech protections prevent the government 
from compelling an individual to subsidize or facilitate 
expression of speech that one disagrees with.  See, e.g., 
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) 
(holding that the government cannot require a newspaper to 
provide space for the expression of certain viewpoints); Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 
U.S. 1 (1986) (rejecting a law that forced a power company to 
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In the end, the Majority’s claim that the Individual 
Employees do not meaningfully participate in their health 
care plans cannot be saved by the hypotheticals on which they 
rely.  Each ignores that the government has coerced the 
Individual Plaintiffs to purchase health insurance with 
provisions deeply offensive to their sincerely held religious 
beliefs.  The hypotheticals thus serve only to underscore the 
weakness of the Majority’s argument.  
 
 4. “Incidental” Effects and Lyng  
 
To bolster its arguments regarding “direct” and 
“active” participation, the Majority tries to link this case and 
Geneva to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association.  In that case the Supreme Court concluded that 
the government’s building of a road on public land used for 
religious purposes by Native Americans was not a violation 
of their right to Free Exercise.  485 U.S. at 447-53.  My 
colleagues also make passing reference (Maj. Op. at 40) to 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986), a Supreme 
Court case relied upon in Lyng which held that requiring the 
use of social security numbers to participate in federal food 
stamp and aid programs was not a significant burden on 
religious beliefs.  See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699-700.  
 
Bowen and Lyng are distinguishable.  Both cases 
recognized the difference between challenges to “certain 
forms of governmental compulsion” and policies that 
amounted to the “Government’s internal procedures.”  
                                                                                                     
allow public interest groups to share a message on its billing 
envelopes).   
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Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700.  In Bowen, because the assignment 
of a social security number did not require the religious 
objectors to do anything, the Court found that the law fell into 
the latter category.  Id. (recognizing that religious protections 
under the Free Exercise clause extend to “what the 
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what 
the individual can extract from the government”) (quotation 
omitted).  And in Lyng, the same was true: the claimants 
sought to stop government action that affected their religious 
practice (i.e. building a road through their lands), but did not 
compel their own behavior.  Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449 (“In both 
cases, the challenged Government action would interfere 
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual 
fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs.  In neither 
case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by 
the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs; 
nor would either governmental action penalize religious 
activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”).  By 
contrast, the ACA forces the Individual Plaintiffs to engage in 
certain behavior – purchasing health insurance – and enforces 
that compulsion with the threat of a significant fine.  
 
My colleagues, however, fixate on the Supreme 
Court’s observation in Lyng that an incidental effect of a 
government program with “no tendency to coerce individuals 
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” is not violative 
of the First Amendment.  (Maj. Op. at 49 n.29.) (quoting 
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51).  Of course, I do not disagree with 
that limitation.  But the Majority is fighting a losing battle 
with common sense when it argues that imposing financial 
penalties on individuals who fail to take action that violates 
their religion has “no tendency to coerce.”  The Mandate 
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coerces the Individual Plaintiffs into violating their beliefs by 
forcing them to purchase a health care plan at odds with their 
religious convictions.  See Verified Complaint at ¶ 46 (JA 99-
100) (“[T]he Real Alternatives employees and their families 
object, on the basis of their sincerely held … religious beliefs, 
to participating in, and/or paying a portion of the premium 
for, a health insurance plan which provides coverage for 
objectionable items for themselves and their family 
members.”).  Thus, the Individual Plaintiffs here are not 
challenging the way the government “conduct[s] its own 
internal affairs,” (Maj. Op. at 40 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 
699)); they are challenging what a government regulation 
requires them to do.24  As the Supreme Court’s recent holding 
                                              
24 The Majority’s collection of out-of-Circuit cases is 
also not persuasive.  I will spare the reader an extensive 
response to each and every one of the cases cited by the 
Majority in its lengthy footnote 33.  Broadly speaking, 
however, the cases cited are simply inapplicable or 
distinguishable.  For instance, some of the cases involve 
situations where the government offered an accommodation 
for religious belief.  See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 
F.3d 938, 947-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding a law creating a 
general prohibition on hunting bald eagles but allowing 
Native Americans to apply for a permit if they need to hunt 
for religious reasons); Berman v. Bd. of Elections, 420 F.2d 
684, 685–86 (2d Cir. 1969) (concluding a case was moot 
where the municipality permitted an individual to vote in 
another polling place when voting in a Church violated his 
religious beliefs).  Others recognized that claimants could 
exercise their religion, without government penalty, in closely 
analogous circumstances that did not impose a burden.  See, 
e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
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in Trinity Lutheran demonstrates, laws that coerce religious 
claimants to disavow their religion in order to receive a 
government benefits are inconsistent with our constitutional 
traditions.  Cf. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022 (finding 
“express discrimination” under the First Amendment where a 
church was denied the opportunity to compete for a 
government benefit “solely because it is a church).25   
                                                                                                     
(upholding a law preventing sale of t-shirts on the National 
Mall against a RFRA challenge because the religious 
individuals seeking to sell their shirts on the Mall had not 
shown why selling on the Mall rather than a few blocks away 
was required by their religious beliefs); Lakewood, Ohio 
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc., v. City of 
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307–08 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding 
a zoning ordinance that limited locations where churches 
could be built where there was no suggestion that building in 
the approved zone would impose a prohibitive cost or 
interfere with the religious mission of the Church).  Most 
fundamentally, none of these cases involved challenges to 
government action that forced individuals to act contrary to 
their religious beliefs under threat of government fine. 
 
25 The Majority says that Trinity Lutheran is not 
relevant because it is “not a RFRA case[.]”  (Maj. Op. at 41 n. 
29.)  But First Amendment cases based on the Free Exercise 
clause certainly are relevant to understanding the meaning 
and application of RFRA.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2778-79 (relying on pre-RFRA cases to analyze a substantial 
burden under RFRA); (Maj. Op. at 43 (relying on Lyng, a pre-
RFRA case)).  And whether the Supreme Court was 
“[s]ignaling its intent to confine its holding” (Maj. Op. at 50 
n.29) in Trinity Lutheran with a footnote is far from clear.  
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The Majority also dresses up the “incidental” point in 
different language and says that RFRA bars claims arising out 
of burdens on third parties.  The faulty logic is that, because 
the Contraceptive Mandate only regulates the insurer and not 
the Individual Plaintiffs, it cannot be a substantial burden 
under RFRA.  See (Maj. Op. at 55 (“The Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the argument that an independent 
obligation on a third party can impose a substantial burden on 
the exercise of religion in violation of RFRA.”  (quoting 
Geneva, 778 F.3d at 440-41))).  But the Individual Plaintiffs 
do not object to insurance companies offering plans with 
contraceptive coverage, making the cases the Majority relies 
on about third parties irrelevant.  The Individual Plaintiffs are 
only asking the government to allow them to purchase a plan 
that does not include the offending coverage – a request that, 
according to this record, would not impose any harm or 
burden on any third parties.  There evidently are insurers 
prepared to fill that market demand, just as there were before 
the ACA told all insurers that they had to eliminate that 
choice.   
 
 5. Opening the Floodgates  
 
The Majority also relies on a floodgates argument to 
hold that the Individual Plaintiffs have not experienced a 
                                                                                                     
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (voicing concern that courts would “mistakenly 
read” that footnote to narrow the scope of the court’s holding 
and pointing out that doing so was “unreasonable” because 
cases are “governed by general principles, rather than ad hoc 
improvisations.” (citation omitted)).   
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substantial burden on their free exercise of religion.  My 
colleagues worry that allowing the Individual Plaintiffs to 
maintain a RFRA claim would open the way to myriad 
challenges to the ACA, because “the categories of services 
that could offend religious beliefs [are] wide-ranging.”  (Maj. 
Op. at 52.)  Thus, “denying … such services to all on the 
basis of the religious objections of some would be neither 
desirable nor administrable.”  Id. 
 
Of course, that fails to address the burden issue at all.  
It is merely an assertion that, regardless of the burden on 
religious belief, it could be difficult for the government to do 
what it wants if any accommodation for religious believers 
must be made.  Sadly, this argument is “the classic rejoinder 
of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for 
you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”  
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006).  It is also the reasoning of the 
dissent in Hobby Lobby, which worried that allowing a RFRA 
challenge to one part of the ACA “would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”  134 S. Ct. at 
2785 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89).  But the Majority 
in Hobby Lobby rightly rejected that hyperbolic concern, 
recognizing that the judiciary is bound to apply the balancing 
test set forth by RFRA to adjudicate such claims.  See id. 
(“But Congress, in enacting RFRA, took the position that ‘the 
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances 
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5))).  The 
command “to enforce RFRA as written[,]” id., requires us to 
avoid imagining a speculative “parade of horribles” as a 
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counterweight to the real burden on real people.  March for 
Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 132; see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 
434 (“RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that courts 
would recognize exceptions—that is how the law works.” 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c))).26 
 
Nevertheless, because the Majority has cited concern 
for the insurance markets as a reason to walk away from 
RFRA, it bears emphasis that there is a simple answer to that 
concern.27  It was given by Judge Richard Leon of the United 
                                              
26 The Majority criticizes my reliance on Gonzales 
because that opinion does not address the Majority’s 
“concerns regarding the end-run on legislation” that would be 
“unleash[ed]” by adjudicating the Individual Plaintiffs’ 
RFRA claim.  (Maj. Op. at 57  n.34.)  But courts are bound to 
adjudicate the substantial burden inquiry under RFRA based 
on the facts before them.  Cf. Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 
160, 201 (3d Cir. 2013), as amended (June 14, 2013) 
(Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“[W]e ought not refuse to grant 
relief that is warranted simply to stem future litigation.”).  
And Gonzales did address an argument that the 
“effectiveness” of the regulation at issue would be 
“necessarily undercut” by granting an exception.  546 U.S. at 
434.  The Court rejected that speculation.  See id. at 435 
(finding that there was “no evidence” that allowing a RFRA 
exemption for claimants would “undercut the Government’s 
ability to enforce” the law with respect to non-claimants).  
 
27 My colleagues claim that the existence of an 
alternative plan is only relevant to “standing and questions of 
redressability” (Maj. Op. at 58 n.36), and yet they emphasize 
concerns about the workability of the insurance market in 
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States District Court for the District of Columbia in his 
thoughtful rebuttal of the “parade of horribles” argument in 
the March for Life case.  He demonstrated that the Majority’s 
argument has no real weight because “[i]nsurance companies 
have every incentive to maintain a sustainable and 
functioning market … .”28  128 F. Supp. 3d at 132.  Thus, 
                                                                                                     
their substantial burden analysis.  See (Id. at 56-57 (worrying 
that “a finding that coverage for one set of objectionable 
services constitutes a substantial burden would imply that 
coverage for all such services imposes a substantial burden – 
an implication that would render the health care system 
totally unworkable” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted))).  As ought to be clear from their own concerns, the 
likely availability of alternative insurance plans is relevant to 
the merits aspects of the case.   
 
28 My colleagues try to rebut this point by dragging a 
red herring across the trail:  they argue that my position 
means I am hostile to all regulation.  See (Maj. Op. at 58  
n.35) (characterizing my position as concluding that “any 
regulation of any market is unnecessary”).  Even if that were 
true, and it most assuredly is not, it is irrelevant to the 
discussion.  To be clear, I am not arguing that all regulation is 
devoid of value.  I am simply stating that, if we conclude that 
individual religious adherents are substantially burdened by 
the regulation, granting them an exemption will not take 
down the system.  The fact that they will have to find an 
insurer – one which is subject to market forces – to provide 
them with their desired plan demonstrates that their request 
will not unravel the system.  If it did present that threat, no 
insurer would offer such a plan.  And we know that at least 
one insurer is likely to offer such a plan.  See March for Life, 
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“the government’s interest in the same would not be 
undermined by simply making it legal for a third-party 
provider to offer, without penalty, a plan consistent with 
[Individual] [P]laintiffs’ religious beliefs.”  Id.  In the event 
that “offering an insurance plan that does not include a 
service or services to which a potential purchaser objects on 
religious grounds would be ‘an impossible administrative 
                                                                                                     
128 F. Supp. 3d at 123 n.6 (recognizing that an insurer was 
willing to offer a contraception-free plan).  What’s more, we 
know that, before the ACA forbade markets to respond to 
consumer demand, many insurers offered such plans and the 
United States managed to have a functioning health insurance 
market.   
 The seatbelt analogy the Majority offers is passing 
strange but must, I suppose, have an answer.  First, 
automobile regulations recognize safety concerns for the 
public generally – who knows who will ride in a vehicle; it 
could be any number of people, and protecting them has been 
deemed wise, so the government did not wait for market 
forces to work.  That safety concern is unlike anything related 
to the Contraceptive Mandate and the insurance market.  
Strangers do not get in and out of your policy as they can get 
in and out of your car.  Moreover, if one were to imagine an 
anti-seatbelt religious sect (a thought exercise which seems to 
demean the religious concerns actually at issue in this case), 
there is no warrant for fearing that, if the government 
permitted members of that sect to buy a car without seatbelts 
or to remove the belts after buying the car, the U.S. 
automobile industry would cease to function.   
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undertaking,’ insurance companies will not do it.” 29  Id.  
When we leave to the insurance companies themselves the 
decision of what coverage options they can profitably 
provide, it is obvious that the “parade of horribles” will not 
begin to march.  See id.  The market managed to provide 
coverage options before the ACA and it is a good bet it can 
do so again.  
 
  6.  “Substantial” Burden 
 
My colleagues repeatedly highlight that government 
action must substantially burden religion in order to be 
cognizable under RFRA, citing Geneva and legislative history 
as proof that the weight of the burden is “the very essence of 
a RFRA claim[.]” (Maj. Op. at 42.)  They say that, even if 
there is a burden on the Individual Plaintiffs, it is not enough 
to be considered “substantial.”  That is the comfortable 
rationale.  “No matter how sincerely held [the Individual 
Plaintiffs’] beliefs may be, we cannot accept at face value that 
subscribing to the plan imposes a ‘substantial burden.’”  (Id. 
at 59.)  In articulating that conclusion, my colleagues 
                                              
29 The Majority argues that I am operating on a false 
premise because “[i]nsurance companies have an interest in a 
sustainable and functioning insurance market only to the 
extent that it is profitable for them.”  (Maj. Op. at 57-58.)  But 
that is exactly my premise and it is not false.  Long-term 
profits are only realizable in a sustainable and functioning 
market.  If the cost of providing plans with carve-outs for 
conscience threatens the viability of the insurance market, 
such plans will not be offered, and they will not be offered 
precisely because insurance companies are motivated by 
profit. 
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recognize that their characterization is “a matter of 
subjectivity,” as indeed it is.  Id. at 48.   
 
 They are, of course, correct that the plain language of 
RFRA forbids the government from “substantially 
burden[ing]” a claimant’s exercise of religion.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(a); Cf. Paek v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 793 
F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e do not resort to 
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” 
(quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 
(1994))).  But as I have already endeavored to show, the 
compelled action here is indeed a substantial burden.  It 
seems to me that the disagreement we have in this case is not 
fundamentally about the burden; it is about the underlying 
belief.   
 
The Majority claims that I have made the misstep of 
“conflat[ing]” the duty to analyze whether a burden is 
substantial with our obligation to accept the validity of a 
claimant’s religious belief.  (Maj. Op. at 43 n.24.)  But, I have 
addressed the two questions distinctly, see supra at 12 (“Once 
we have determined that an adherent has an honest 
conviction, we ask if the government regulation imposes a 
substantial burden on adherence to that conviction.”), 
knowing that caution is needed because an evaluation of the 
substantiality of a burden can easily cross into the forbidden 
territory of opining on the merits of a claimant’s beliefs.  See 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777-78 (recognizing that 
focusing on the closeness of “connection between what the 
objecting parties must do … and the end they find to be 
morally wrong” in reality “dodges the question that RFRA 
presents … and instead addresses a very different question 
that the federal courts have no business addressing”).  
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It is the Majority’s approach that runs afoul of binding 
precedent,30 and my colleagues’ rejection of the deference we 
                                              
30 In support of its interpretation of the substantiality 
requirement, the Majority repeatedly cites to the dissenting 
opinion in Hobby Lobby, see (Maj. Op. at 46-47; 51 n.30), as 
well as secondary sources arguing against the majority 
opinion in Hobby Lobby, see, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, 
“Substantial” Burdens:  How Courts May (and Why They 
Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 94, 101 (2017) (lauding the dissent in Hobby 
Lobby for “question[ing]” what it characterizes as “a doctrinal 
regime that renders RFRA’s substantial burden element 
functionally nonjusticiable”); Matthew A. Melone, 
Corporations and Religious Freedom:  Hobby Lobby 
Stores—A Missed Opportunity to Reconcile a Flawed Law 
with a Flawed Health Care System, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 461, 503 
(2015) (taking the position that “an imposition on 
conscience” that arises from the Mandate “is not a burden on 
exercise at all”).  Those writings may make for interesting 
reading but they are not the law, no matter how earnestly the 
Majority wishes they were.  Legal academics are free to 
disregard Supreme Court precedent, but we are not.  On many 
difficult issues, including this one, there are law review 
articles with varying perspectives, compare Gedicks, supra, 
with Scott W. Gaylord, RFRA Rights Revisited: Substantial 
Burdens, Judicial Competence, and the Religious Nonprofit 
Cases, 81 MO. L. REV. 655 (2016) (arguing that Hobby Lobby 
precludes courts from considering the weight of the burden 
imposed on religious claimants), but that intellectual variety 
does not mean courts can adopt the reasoning they find most 
appealing, rather than abiding by controlling Supreme Court 
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owe to the Individual Plaintiffs’ convictions is at odds with 
the respect that has historically governed our approach to 
expressions of religious belief.  “The religious views 
espoused by respondents might seem incredible” to some 
people, “[b]ut if those doctrines are subject to trial … [to 
determine] their truth or falsity, then the same can be done 
with the religious beliefs of any sect.”  United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).  When judges wade into 
those waters, “they enter a forbidden domain.”  Id.; see also 
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments, Papers 8:298—304 (June 20, 1785) 
(critiquing the notion that a civil judge can be “a competent 
Judge of Religious Truth”).  My friends in the Majority do 
not simply wade in; they dive in with gusto, commenting that 
their analysis allows them to “enumerate[] [each] allegation 
in turn, and … conclude that the Real Alternatives Employees 
have failed to demonstrate that the Contraceptive Mandate 
forces them to violate their religious beliefs.”  (Maj. Op. at 
43.) 
 
I sincerely wish that this were not the Majority’s 
analytical approach.  In a powerful dissent from the denial of 
en banc review in the Little Sisters of the Poor case, Judge 
Harris Hartz of the Tenth Circuit pointed out how fraught 
with ill-consequences it can be.31  Calling it a “dangerous 
                                                                                                     
precedent.  We are required to follow Hobby Lobby, and I am 
pleased to do so since its reasoning is entirely persuasive.  
 
31 The Majority criticizes my reliance on the dissenting 
opinion in Little Sisters.  I cite it as persuasive, not binding, 
authority.  And I note that the majority opinion in Little 
Sisters was vacated by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. 
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approach to religious liberty,” Judge Hartz asked whether our 
country could “really tolerate letting courts examine the 
reasoning behind a religious practice or belief and decide 
what is core and what is derivative?”  Little Sisters, 799 F.3d 
at 1317 (Hartz, J., dissenting).  He used two examples to 
demonstrate the serious problems raised by a what’s-the-big-
deal approach.  First, it could require a Christian “to work on 
December 25 because, according to a court, his core belief is 
that he should not work on the anniversary of the birth of 
Jesus but a history of the calendar and other sources show that 
Jesus was actually born in March.”  Id.  Next, he said it would 
allow the government to provide a Jewish prisoner with “only 
non-kosher food because the real purpose of biblical dietary 
laws is health, so as long as the pork is well-cooked, etc., the 
prisoner’s religious beliefs are not substantially burdened.”  
Id. at 1317-18.  Such reasoning is “contrary to all precedent 
concerning the free exercise of religion.”  Id. at 1318.   
 
I agree with Judge Hartz and decline to question the 
Individual Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs under the guise of 
adjudicating “substantial burden.”  I respect their convictions 
and conclude that the Contraceptive Mandate – which forces 
them, under threat of monetary penalty, to sign up for and 
participate in a system that violates their devoutly held beliefs 
about human life – is a substantial burden on their exercise of 
religion.  
                                                                                                     
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).  Moreover, my colleagues in 
the Majority are not consistent in their rejection of dissenting 
opinions.  See (Maj. Op. at 46-47 (favorably describing the 
dissent in Hobby Lobby). 
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C.  Strict Scrutiny 
 
 Because the Individual Plaintiffs are “substantially 
burdened” by the Contraceptive Mandate, I turn to the “strict 
scrutiny” questions the Majority does not address: whether 
the government action is “in furtherance of a compelling 
government interest” and is the “least restrictive means” of 
achieving that interest.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  That 
standard is “exceptionally demanding,” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2780, and the government’s arguments are inadequate.  
Along with many others who have considered the matter, I do 
not believe that the Contraceptive Mandate can survive strict 
scrutiny. 32  See id.  (“HHS has not shown that it lacks other 
means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting 
parties in these cases.”); March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 
131 (“The final question the Court must ask under RFRA is 
whether the current Mandate is the least restrictive means of 
serving this governmental interest.  Assuredly, it is not!”); 
Wieland, 196 F. Supp. 3d at 1019 (holding that the 
“government has not met its burden” to satisfy RFRA).  I 
                                              
32 The Majority avoids this step in the analysis by 
holding that the Individual Plaintiffs are not substantially 
burdened by the Mandate.  My colleagues claim that I am 
wrong to recognize that the Mandate has not survived strict 
scrutiny on repeated occasions because only two courts have 
“addressed the precise question before us today.”  (Maj. Op. 
at 59 n.37.)  It is true that only two courts have faced the 
identical dilemma, see supra p. 16-17, but I am confident that 
the outcomes in the avalanche of related litigation the 
Mandate has spawned are relevant, see, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2779-81, and that is what I have referred to.  
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consider in turn both the interest initially advanced by the 
government – access to contraception – and the government’s 
newly discovered interest – a universal health care system.  
 
1.  Access to Contraception 
 
In Hobby Lobby, the majority opinion assumed 
without deciding that one interest proffered by the 
government was compelling: “ensuring that all women have 
access to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost 
sharing.”  134 S. Ct. at 2779.  If that is a given, the question 
becomes whether the Mandate is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling government interest.  The test is 
sometimes framed as an inquiry into whether the means is 
“precisely tailored” to meet the compelling interest.  Id. at 
2783; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (recognizing in the 
Free Exercise context that a burden on religion “must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 
narrowly tailored to advance that interest”).  The Hobby 
Lobby Court concluded that there were several other options 
available to the government to meet that interest, the most 
straightforward of which would be for “the government to 
assume the cost of providing the contraceptives at issue to 
any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-
insurance policies due to their employers’ religious 
objections.”  134 S. Ct. at 2780.  Here, the government could 
surely do the same thing, defraying the cost of contraceptive 
coverage to the extent necessary to make up for the absence 
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of people in the insurance pool who decline the coverage.33  If 
allowing some people to opt out of the Mandate ended up 
costing any significant amount, the government – whose 
interest it is – could absorb the cost.  See id. at 2781 (“RFRA 
… may in some circumstances require the government to 
expend additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious 
beliefs.”).   
 
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court observed that the 
government had “already established an accommodation for 
nonprofit organizations with religious objections[,]” id. at 
2782, and the very existence of that accommodation proved 
that less restrictive means could be used to reach the 
government’s ends.  See id. (considering that the 
accommodation would “not impinge on the plaintiffs’ 
religious belief … and it serves HHS’s stated interests equally 
well”).  The same is true here.  The government briefly argues 
that an accommodation cannot be possible for individual 
buyers of insurance, saying that exemptions to the Mandate 
“apply only to employers … not individuals.”  See (Gov. Br. 
at 29 (quoting District Court Opinion, JA 76)).  But the 
government does not justify why employers deserve an 
accommodation and individuals do not.  Indeed, the argument 
is quite an about-face from the position the government took 
in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, when it contended 
loudly that only individuals could have religious scruples and 
the companies who employed them could not.  Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2774 (“HHS contends that Congress could not 
                                              
33 It is not clear that the government would need to 
step in at all, since the number of people wanting to avoid 
such coverage is unknown.  
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have wanted RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations 
because it is difficult as a practical matter to ascertain the 
sincere ‘beliefs’ of a corporation.”); Conestoga Wood, 724 
F.3d at 403 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (noting the irony in the 
idea “religious belief takes shape within the minds and hearts 
of individuals” while denying religious liberty to “an entity 
that is nothing more than the common vision of five 
individuals from one family who are of one heart and mind 
about their religious belief”).  The Individual Plaintiffs have 
proposed a number of ways the government could satisfy its 
interest in providing contraceptive coverage.34     
 
Parties to the Zubik litigation also suggested ways that 
access to contraceptives could be provided without trampling 
on religious beliefs.  See Zubik v. Burwell, Supp. Reply Brief 
For Petitioners, 2016 WL 1593773 at *1 (filed April 20, 
2016) (“The government concedes … that its existing 
regulatory scheme ‘could be modified’ to eliminate the self-
certification requirement for petitioners with insured plans 
without sacrificing its professed objective of ‘ensuring that 
the affected women receive contraceptive coverage 
seamlessly.’”) (quoting Respondent’s Supp. Br. at 14-15).  
The Petitioners in Zubik outlined a solution in which “the 
insurance company [could be made to] make available to plan 
beneficiaries a separate plan providing the excluded 
                                              
34 The government could include religiously-objecting 
families in “existing federal family planning programs” that 
provide coverage for free or reduced rates; provide objecting 
families with “federal subsidies” to offset the cost of the 
coverage; or require the government to pay insurance 
companies directly for the added cost of contraceptive 
coverage.  See (Opening Br. at 54-55).   
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contraceptive coverage” and separately “contact beneficiaries 
to inform them of that plan and how to enroll.”  See Zubik, 
Supp. Br. for Petitioners, 2016 WL 1445914 at *4 (filed 
April 12, 2016).  The distinct plans would be akin to dental or 
vision insurance that are “truly” independent of general health 
insurance and have a separate enrollment process, insurance 
card, and payment source.  Id. at *1.  That same option could 
be provided to individuals purchasing health care on the open 
market.   
 
The wisdom of those options may be debated, but not 
their existence, so the government’s decision to simply refuse 
to engage in the discussion is telling.  It appears that the 
government “has open to it [several] less drastic way[s] of 
satisfying its legitimate interest[]” and has made “no showing 
that any of the [Individual Plaintiffs’] alternative ideas would 
be unworkable.”  See Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 414-15 
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  Thus, the 
government’s position cannot withstand strict scrutiny.  
 
2. A Uniform Health Care System 
 
Evidently recognizing that it cannot win if its interest 
is described as providing contraceptive coverage, the 
government actually abandons that position and declares it to 
be “irrelevant,”  (Responding Br. at 27), which is remarkable 
given how intensely it insisted that that interest was 
compelling before.  Nevermind.  It has a new set of interests 
now.  In its words, “a compelling interest in the provision of 
health care and the functioning of the insurance market … 
[and] a corresponding ‘interest in the uniformity of the health 
care system the ACA puts in place, under which all eligible 
citizens receive the same minimum level of coverage’” are 
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the only rationales we should consider.  (Responding Br. at 
25 (quoting Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, 772 F.3d 229, 265 (D.C.Cir. 2014)).)35 
 
These sweeping claims fly in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s command in Hobby Lobby that compelling 
government interests must be precisely defined.  The Court 
there rejected the government’s attempt to assert interests that 
were “couched in very broad terms, such as promoting 
‘public health’ and ‘gender equality.’”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2779.  Instead, it said, judges are “to loo[k] beyond 
broadly formulated interests and to scrutinize[e] the asserted 
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious 
claimants—in other words, to look to the marginal interest in 
enforcing the Contraceptive Mandate in these cases.”  Id. 
(alterations in original) (quotations omitted).  A generalized 
interest in health care and insurance is too abstract to be 
compelling in a legal sense when addressing the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ request for relief.  
 
No more compelling is the government’s claimed 
interest in uniformity of the Mandate’s application.  That 
claim cannot be given credence because millions of people 
have already been excepted.  “The Mandate is a classic … 
                                              
35 There is more than a whiff of gamesmanship about 
the government’s newly claimed compelling interest.  In a 
strict scrutiny analysis, we ordinarily reject “post hoc 
rationalizations” for government action and instead rely on 
the “basis [for the regulation] articulated by the agency 
itself.”  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).  
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example of … arbitrary underinclusiveness.”  Conestoga 
Wood, 724 F.3d at 414-15 (Jordan, J., dissenting).  As the 
Supreme Court observed, “[a]ll told, the Contraceptive 
Mandate presently does not apply to tens of millions of 
people.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (internal quotation 
and citation omitted).  “A law cannot be regarded as 
protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves 
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited.”  Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 413 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 
547).36  The government cannot persuasively declare that it 
has an interest in universality and uniformness – only to, at 
the same time, make the means decidedly not universal and 
                                              
36 In addition to the variety of exemptions from the 
employer mandate discussed in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2764, there are also a wide variety of exemptions from the 
individual mandate.  Significantly, there is an exemption for 
those who have membership in a religious sect that objects to 
insurance.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A).  Additionally, 
individuals who participate in a previously-existing “health 
care sharing ministry” are exempted from the Mandate.  26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (defining a health care sharing 
ministry as a tax-exempt organization of members who “share 
a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical 
expenses among members in accordance with those beliefs” 
that has existed since December 31, 1999).  Those additional 
exemptions further underscore the Mandate’s 
underinclusiveness.   
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uniform.  Because of this incongruity, the claimed interest 
cannot credibly be characterized as compelling.37   
                                              
37 The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit in Priests For Life v. United States 
Department of Health & Human Services, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), accepted a number of government 
interests as compelling, including “a sustainable system of 
taxes and subsidies under the ACA to advance public health.”  
Id. at 258.  In considering the Mandate’s furtherance of that 
interest, the court concluded that “[t]he government’s interest 
in a comprehensive, broadly available system is not undercut 
by the other exemptions in the ACA, such as the exemptions 
for religious employers, small employers, and grandfathered 
plans.”  Id. at 266.   
That holding is not binding on us and, in any event, is 
an assertion rather than a reasoned conclusion.  The scope of 
the exceptions here is far more significant than the “narrow 
category” exempted from Social Security in United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252,  261 (1982).  See Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd 
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (“[T]he interest here cannot be compelling 
because the contraceptive-coverage requirement presently 
does not apply to tens of millions of people.”).  I am 
persuaded that the number of “congressional exemptions” to 
the Mandate demonstrate that the ACA does “not preclude 
exceptions altogether” and “RFRA makes clear that it is the 
obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are 
required under the test set forth by Congress.”  Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
421, 434 (2006).  
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Charitably assuming that the government’s interest is 
better understood as a functioning and comprehensive 
insurance market, the Mandate is again not the least 
restrictive means of achieving that interest.  The government 
points to United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-258, to say a 
universal system can be the least restrictive means to achieve 
a compelling interest.  True enough.  But in Lee, the Supreme 
Court was considering taxation to provide a “comprehensive 
national social security system.”  Id. at 258.  As Judge Leon 
pointed out in March for Life, there is a “critical distinction” 
between that scheme and the ACA:  
 
Unlike in Lee, the government does not provide 
the insurance at issue here, and there is no 
single “comprehensive national [health 
insurance] system.” See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258, 
102 S. Ct. 1051.  Instead, the government 
regulates a host of third party insurers. The 
Mandate burdens employee plaintiffs’ religious 
exercise by restricting the form in which those 
third parties can offer something that plaintiffs, 
for all intents and purposes, must buy. 
 
March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 131–32.   
 
Understood from that perspective, there is an obvious 
solution to further the government’s interest: refrain from 
penalizing insurers who offer plans in accordance with the 
Individual Plaintiffs’ beliefs.  Id. at 132 (“The government 
need not require an insurer offer such a plan at plaintiffs’ 
request in order to avoid burdening plaintiffs’ religious 
exercise.”).  Because insurance companies would offer such 
plans as a result of market forces, doing so would not 
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undermine the government’s interest in a “sustainable and 
functioning market.”  Id.  And that remedy would also 
necessarily be limited in scope; it would not “enable 
[insurance companies] to refuse to provide [contraceptive] 
coverage to others who do not share those religious 
objections.”  Id.  Because the government has failed to 
demonstrate why allowing such a system (not unlike the one 
that allowed wider choice before the ACA) would be 
unworkable, it has not satisfied strict scrutiny.  
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
To the Majority, this is all much ado about nothing: the 
burden of signing forms and paying money in support of 
drugs, devices, and procedures that affect the well springs of 
human life is so slight it cannot be called substantial, so the 
Individual Plaintiffs should simply sign and pay and stop 
complaining.  What my colleagues fail to appreciate is that 
coercing financial support for something deeply objectionable 
is a real and substantial burden, and a forced signature alone 
can be problematic.  In matters of conscience, the signing of 
one’s name is more than a scrawl on paper.  Robert Bolt gave 
these compelling words to Sir (and Saint) Thomas More in 
the play “A Man for All Seasons”: “When a man takes an 
oath, … he’s holding his own self in his hands.  Like water.  
And if he opens his fingers then – he needn’t hope to find 
himself again.”   
 
The Individual Plaintiffs do not want to lose 
themselves.  They have demonstrated the seriousness of the 
burdens forced upon them by the Contraceptive Mandate.  
Under RFRA, it thus became incumbent on the government to 
show that its actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a 
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compelling purpose.  In my estimation, the government has 
failed to meet that exacting standard.  I thus respectfully 
dissent and concur only in the judgment as to Real 
Alternatives, not in the judgment against the Individual 
Plaintiffs.  
